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CONGRESS AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM
Ryan Baasch* & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash**
Abstract
Though the Constitution conspicuously bars some state involvement in foreign
affairs, the states clearly retain some authority in foreign affairs. Correctly
supposing that state participation may unnecessarily complicate or embarrass
our nation’s foreign relations, the Supreme Court has embraced aggressive
preemption doctrines that sporadically oust the states from discrete areas in
foreign affairs. These doctrines are unprincipled, supply little guidance, and
generate capricious results. Fortunately, there is a better way. While the Con-
stitution permits the states a limited and continuing role, it never goes so far
as guaranteeing them any foreign affairs authority. Furthermore, the Consti-
tution authorizes Congress to enact laws necessary and proper for carrying
into execution federal powers. We believe that Congress can use this authority
to adopt preemption mechanisms that reflect its view of the optimal role of
states in international affairs. When it comes to policing state involvement in
foreign affairs, Congress, rather than the courts, ought to be in the driver’s
seat. Critically, Congress can proactively police the states, meaning that it need
not wait for state mischief before enacting legislation. To give a sense of the
possible and to alter the terms of a debate focused on judicial policing of the
states, we recommend several novel mechanisms of preempting or deterring
state intervention in foreign affairs and suggest categories of state law that
ought to trigger these mechanisms. The precise mix is for Congress to consider
based on its own sense of the vices and virtues of state forays in international
affairs and of our existing foreign affairs federalism.
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“[I]f all the discontented people in this country are to be suffered to tam-
per and negotiate with foreign Powers, it would lead to the most serious
consequences.”1
Introduction
Imagine that the president invites a divisive Middle Eastern leader to the
United States for talks. An American mayor passionately disagrees with this
decision and interjects in a fantastic way: the meddlesome mayor unceremo-
niously ejects the foreigner from a local event, branding him a terrorist and
murderer. The mayor, lacking any diplomatic pedigree and unaccountable
to the nation, has severely undercut the nation’s conduct of foreign policy.
This all seems farfetched. Yet it is no law school hypothetical. New York
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani once ousted Palestinian Liberation Organization
Chairman Yasser Arafat from a Lincoln Center concert, claiming that Arafat
was a murderer of Americans and a terrorist.2 The Clinton Administration
1. 9 Annals of Cong. 2495 (1798) (comments of John F. Rutledge, Jr., of South
Carolina).
2. David Firestone, White House Condemns Giuliani for Ejecting Arafat from Concert,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1995, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/25/us/un-50-arafat-white-
house-condemns-giuliani-for-ejecting-arafat-concert.html [https://perma.cc/4PYH-XXHC].
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could do little more than sputter that the episode was “an embarrassment to
everyone associated with diplomacy,”3 and had greatly complicated the
peace process and the federal government’s foreign policy agenda.4
The incident illustrates how subnational actors can complicate, unsettle,
and obstruct our federal government’s conduct of foreign affairs.5 While
that government’s authority to steer our nation’s foreign affairs is undis-
puted, a few scholars insist that the Constitution leaves states with residual
authority in foreign affairs.6 Perhaps such scholars suppose that the often-
amateurish state intrusions in foreign affairs are simply unavoidable because
the Constitution affirmatively safeguards the ability of states to have their
own foreign relations.
In our view, the Constitution forms a “more perfect” foreign affairs
federalism. We agree that the Constitution does not forbid state and local
actors from dabbling in foreign affairs. Yet that is a far cry from supposing
that it somehow guarantees that states may pursue their own foreign policies.
The Constitution contains no such pledge or assurance of states’ rights in
foreign affairs. To the contrary, it contains the seeds of a federal solution to
the problem of state interference. By statute, Congress may bar state med-
dling in foreign affairs. In fact, if Congress concludes that multiple voices
burden the federal government’s exercise of its foreign affairs authority, it
can wholly divest the states of their ability to pursue foreign policies. In sum,
Congress can end foreign affairs federalism as it exists today.
3. Id.
4. Lest one think the mayor’s policy is somehow more righteous than the federal ap-
proach, Giuliani had previously welcomed a leader of the Irish Republican Army to city hall.
Earl H. Fry, The Expanding Role of State and Local Governments in U.S. Foreign
Affairs 98 (1998).
5. For a list of particularly controversial state intrusions into foreign affairs, see id. at
92–100. In the 1970s, Idaho sponsored trade missions to Libya despite Washington’s disap-
proval of the el-Qaddafi regime. Id. at 92. During the height of Cold War tensions, New York
and New Jersey refused to allow a Soviet emissary to land in their airports in order to attend a
U.N. session. Id. Acting against federal oil policy, Texas has sent representatives to OPEC
meetings in order to influence global prices. Id. at 95.
6. See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 Am. J.
Int’l. L. 821, 826–27 (1989) (suggesting that the First Amendment might protect state foreign
affairs resolutions); Terrence Guay, Local Government and Global Politics: The Implications of
Massachusetts’ “Burma Law”, 115 Pol. Sci. Q. 353, 365 (2000) (exploring the popularity of
this position with state legislators); Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Ini-
tiatives and Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 Stan. J. Int’l
L. 1, 47 (1999) (concluding that “state and local sense resolutions and market participation
measures . . . . lie beyond the preemptive power of the federal government”). Some local
politicians suppose that they have “the right and ability to use state-level restrictions to re-
spond to legitimate public concerns” even when those restrictions implicate foreign affairs.
Guay, supra, at 365. Others argue that it is “an age-old function of state legislatures” to influ-
ence the national government, including its foreign dealings, via state resolves and participa-
tion in the marketplace. Id.
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In Part I we advance our case for one voice—that, as a normative mat-
ter, the states should not intervene in foreign affairs.7 The states should stand
deaf and mute in the foreign arena because they lack the expertise and
knowledge necessary to engage in that arena. States lack a cadre of resident
international specialists (State Department bureaucrats) and do not have the
benefit of semipermanent officials stationed abroad (ambassadors and their
extensive retinue of experts). Moreover, as the Supreme Court and others
have long recognized, difficulties and disadvantages ensue when states pur-
sue their own foreign policies.8 For instance, as a general matter little is
gained by having some states court certain nations while others—including
perhaps the federal government—disfavor those same sovereigns. Finally,
and relatedly, the states may cause real mischief. Besides Mayor Giuliani’s
escapade, consider Idaho’s misguided pursuit of trade with Libya in the
1970s. Despite clear executive disapproval of Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime
and Libya’s evident intention “to bring pressure to bear on Idaho’s repre-
sentatives in Washington” as a means of securing withheld military jets,
Idaho doggedly sought a commercial relationship with the rogue regime.9
Part II considers the judiciary’s role in aggressively policing state intru-
sion in the international arena and explains the inadequacies of this jurocen-
tric approach. The Supreme Court employs aggressive preemption doctrines
that, without entirely forbidding state involvement, often thwart state inter-
loping. We have no quarrel with express or conflict preemption—where
contrary federal law exists courts must declare state and local laws pre-
empted. Moreover, we endorse the view that the states’ interventions in for-
eign affairs are often suboptimal. Yet to its discredit, the Court has
repeatedly stretched and strained in this area, often preempting on specious
grounds.10 The judiciary’s overweening desire to suppress the states has gen-
erated some rather unedifying cases and doctrines.
Part III takes up the Constitution’s approach to foreign affairs federal-
ism. We conclude that though the Constitution bars certain state actions in
7. As we discuss later, ours is a claim about the need for federal stewardship of foreign
affairs, even when that stewardship involves many voices, including Congress and the execu-
tive. Our claims are orthogonal to the debate about the allocation of federal foreign affairs
authority across the political branches. Hence we have nothing to say about the Court’s recent
decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). For an extended discussion of the case,
see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Zivotofsky and the Separation of Powers, 2015 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
8. See infra Section I.A.
9. See William Safire, Libya and Idaho, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1979, at A27. El-Qaddafi
viewed one of the senators from Idaho as a key figure in enabling his eventual receipt of the
military jets. Demonstrating the considerable foreign policy implications of Idaho’s trade rela-
tions with Libya, one Idaho politician remarked that “the first question [the Libyans] ask
everybody is how they’re going to get their jets delivered.” Id. It seems mistaken for a foreign
sovereign to believe that a single state could secure the desired jets. Nonetheless, it was outra-
geous for Idaho to seek a relationship in the face of such apparent desires.
10. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). The Crosby
Court implausibly read a federal statute imposing sanctions on Burma as if it erected an im-
plied obstacle to supplemental state sanctions. Id. at 372–73.
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foreign affairs,11 it never ousts them from the field.12 And yet it also never
explicitly (or implicitly) guarantees the states a role in foreign affairs. In a
sense, the Constitution establishes a default rule, one that permits states to
have their own foreign policies without actually safeguarding any such au-
thority. Part III closes by advancing a theory of congressional authority
under which the political branches (rather than the courts) may more effica-
ciously cabin the states. The Necessary and Proper Clause, along with other
foreign affairs grants to the federal government, empower Congress to com-
pletely oust the states from foreign affairs. Congress may do so on the theory
that state interloping obstructs the sound exercise of federal power and that
preemption is therefore necessary and proper to carry federal foreign affairs
powers into execution. In sum, Congress may adopt measures meant to en-
sure that the states, rather than standing disunited, are “made one as to all
foreign . . . matters.”13
Part IV advances a novel preemption regime. One scholar has argued
that because “[t]here is no precise demarcation between the local and the
international” it is impossible to “invalidate all state laws potentially impli-
cating foreign nations.”14 We take up this challenge. We suggest federal
mechanisms that Congress could employ to guard against state intrusions,
including preclearance and temporary suspension of state laws.15 We also
propose a number of categories (we call them state “triggers”) that Congress
could consider as a means of identifying state laws that interfere in interna-
tional affairs. For instance, Congress might wish to preempt state laws that
single out particular countries (e.g., a state sanctioning Iran by name). Or
Congress might wish to impede the enforcement of state laws that mete out
different treatment based on the type of foreign government (e.g., a state law
11. The Constitution expressly provides that the states may not “enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation [or] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10,
cl. 1. Further, the states are permitted to do certain acts, but only with Congressional consent.
Specifically, states may not “enter into any Agreement or Compact with . . . a foreign Power,
or engage in War” except under extreme circumstances, unless they have the consent of Con-
gress. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
12. How much foreign affairs authority the states retain under the constitutional default
is uncertain. The answer turns on the scope of foreign affairs powers that they would have had
in the absence of the express restrictions in Section 10 and any implicit constraints that arise
from the affirmative grants to Congress and the president. The answer also rests on the
breadth of those restrictions and constraints. We do not develop a theory of the scope of state
authority but instead join the long list of scholars who read the Constitution as implicitly
permitting states to play continuing roles in foreign affairs.
13. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Jones (Aug. 14, 1787), in 12 The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 33, 34 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955).
14. Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Under-
standing of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 341, 374 (1999).
15. We use the term “state laws” to refer to all activities pursued by either state or local
governments, as they relate to foreign affairs. Hence our use of the phrase goes beyond mere
legislation. Our usage is in keeping with the bulk of scholarly literature on the topic. See, e.g.,
id. at 345 n.13 (“For convenience I will refer only to ‘state’ laws and activities affecting foreign
affairs, although I mean that term also to encompass the activities of local government.”).
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that turns on whether a government owns the means of production). Fi-
nally, we discuss how best to pair state law triggers with federal preemptive
mechanisms. This is a complex undertaking, for an infinite number of state
activities may affect our nation’s foreign affairs. We believe, however, that
Congress could construct a refined framework that would permit states to
enact legislation pertaining to their traditional spheres of authority while
also enabling the federal government to effectively and expeditiously block
laws that interfere with its conduct of foreign affairs.
I. Cacophonous Foreign Affairs
The case against state involvement in foreign affairs is easy to make.
States are unqualified to act in the international arena because they lack the
information and the expertise that comes from continued and sustained en-
gagement in foreign matters. Because of their ignorance and inexperience,
states are apt to anger allies and undermine the actions and priorities of the
more expert federal political branches. Those untutored in foreign matters
should not be suffered to hamper those more informed and skilled, however
good the intentions of the former. Further, the international ventures of
state officials run counter to popular expectations. Voters expect that local
officials will stick to local matters and that federal officials—senators, repre-
sentatives, presidents—will steer our nation’s diplomacy. In sum, foreign
affairs federalism, as it operates today, imposes substantial costs and renders
the United States disunited before the world.
Some scholars disagree with our diagnosis. A few of them claim that
state intervention generates weighty benefits. Others suggest that the draw-
backs of state freelancing are insignificant, or are manageable. We disagree.
This Part highlights the drawbacks of state involvement in foreign affairs.  It
then maintains that the supposed benefits of many voices in foreign affairs
are illusory.
A. The Need for One Voice
The states are incompetent actors on the international stage and often
act in ways that sabotage those more fluent in foreign affairs. First, the states
lack the tools—the information, expertise, and infrastructure—to effectively
formulate and pursue foreign policies. Second, and relatedly, because state
and local actors are ignorant they are prone to offend and embarrass foreign
nations, including valued allies. Third, their episodic interventions under-
mine the actions of more competent actors—Congress and the president—
because they sow confusion internationally. Finally, state participation in
foreign affairs contradicts a foundational premise of our national system,
namely that the parts of the union ought not to be able to take actions that
undermine the entire union.16
16. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 6, at 827–28 (expressing similar concerns).
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Our first concern—state incompetence—has a long historical pedigree.
One founder referred to the states as “dumb” and “deaf” in the international
arena due to their inability to communicate with foreign nations.17 We
doubt that such claims rested solely on a supposed lack of constitutional
authority in foreign affairs; rather, we think the claims also reflected the
sense that the states were handicapped on the international stage. States are
no less disadvantaged today. They continue to lack the capacity to partici-
pate in international affairs in meaningful ways.
Compare the competencies of federal and state institutions. No state
maintains anything resembling the State Department that might help con-
duct or manage its foreign affairs. The closest analogs are a handful of “in-
ternational trade offices.”18 But these single-issue, tiny offices pale in
comparison to the institutional expertise, experience, and resources of the
State Department. Indeed, the size and expertise of foreign policy personnel
in other federal departments (like the Departments of Commerce, Defense,
and Homeland Security) vastly outstrips the scope and knowledge of these
undersized state trade offices.
Consider California: The Golden State is a regular interloper in foreign
affairs.19 As the world’s eighth largest economy as of 2013,20 it has the re-
sources and, one would suppose, an acute need for extensive information as
a means of fostering foreign trade. Yet if foreign trade expertise was truly
vital, California’s resource allocation ill reflects that need. To date, California
has established a trade office in China and granted it a $700,000 budget.21
That is its only international trade office.22 By contrast, the fiscal year 2015
appropriation for the State Department was just short of $50 billion.23
Money earmarked for our nation’s spy agencies—the CIA, for example—is
classified, but reputable insiders have indicated the sum nearly equals the
17. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 323 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966) [hereinafter Records of the Federal Convention].
18. For a list of states and their international trade offices, see State International Trade
Offices, Minority Business Development Agency, U.S. Dep’t of Com., http://www.mbda.
gov/main/global-business/state-international-trade-offices [https://perma.cc/ZZU4-77VV].
19. See Am. Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003); Movsesian v. Victoria Ver-
sicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of
Cal., Proclamation on Armenian Genocide (Apr. 7, 2008), http://www.anca.org/assets/pdf/
proclamations/CA2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TVX-WX5A] (explicitly recognizing the Arme-
nian genocide, in contrast to federal policy).
20. California Once Again the World’s 8th Largest Economy, Ctr. for Continuing Study
of the Cal. Econ. (July 2014), http://www.ccsce.com/PDF/Numbers-July-2014-CA-Economy
-Rankings-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5L7-T5VN].
21. For the statutory authority for this project, see Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 13996.4–
13996.75 (West 2015).
22. See Governor’s Office of Bus. and Econ. Dev., California-China Office of
Trade and Investment 2014 Annual Report (2014), http://www.business.ca.gov/Portals/0/
InternationalBiz/Docs/2014%20China%20Trade%20Office%20Report%20FINAL.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9H6L-GZ9M].
23. H.R. Rep. No. 113-499, at 4 (2014).
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State Department’s allocation.24 And this summary omits the massive re-
sources expended on foreign affairs in the Departments of Defense, Home-
land Security, Commerce, Treasury, and elsewhere.
Even if we were to concede that states somehow gather adequate trade
intelligence through their tiny trade offices, states enact laws with serious
ramifications outside the commercial realm. For instance, few would sup-
pose that an Idaho trade office could possibly supply the state with the req-
uisite knowledge necessary to gauge whether the state ought to aid in Libya’s
quest for military jets during the el-Qaddafi era. To have a meaningful opin-
ion on the latter requires knowledge about Libya’s neighbors, their potential
reaction, and, of course, Libya’s intentions. Similarly, a trade office cannot
generate useful information about how foreign nations will react to eco-
nomic sanctions meant to curb human rights violations, especially when
those sanctions attach to companies that are from nations that have unblem-
ished records. How Germany will react when its companies are sanctioned
by Massachusetts for doing business in Burma is hardly obvious.
The gulf between the foreign experience and knowledge of the federal
government as compared to the states cannot be overstated. Whatever else
one might say about the sprawling federal bureaucracy, its superior infor-
mation and familiarity in foreign affairs is beyond question.25
Our second concern is related to the first. Because the states are igno-
rant, they are prone to offend and inflame foreign nations. States can pro-
voke already hostile or unfriendly regimes, making fraught relations worse.
Recall Rudolph Giuliani’s ouster of Yasser Arafat from the Lincoln Center, a
decision that, to us at least, reflects a certain naı̈veté, namely a failure to
appreciate the need to sometimes treat parties that have American blood on
their hands with respect.26 Enemies can, through time and a convergence of
interests, become partners, as happened with Germany and Japan. States
also can embarrass allies, damaging relationships the federal government has
24. See Scott Shane, Official Reveals Budget for U.S. Intelligence, N.Y. Times (Nov. 7,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/08/politics/official-reveals-budget-for-us-intelligence.
html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/R3YZ-NG9P] (suggesting that the 2005 budget for all of the na-
tion’s spy agencies exceeded 40 billion dollars).
25. Some of the federal advantages are perhaps erodible, in that states might be able to
set up their own foreign policy institutions. But to achieve anything close to parity with the
federal government would take decades and involve the expenditure of truly vast sums in each
state. The fact that states have yet to pour resources into the sound exercise of their foreign
affairs powers suggests that states are unlikely to embark on a project of acquiring information
and experience in foreign affairs. They seem content to make episodic interventions in this
area with little or no knowledge or expertise.
26. See Firestone, supra note 2. That Arafat was the head of an entity that the United
States did not recognize as a state hardly undermines our claim, for Giuliani might have meted
out the same treatment to the prime minister of Great Britain or the president of Russia. As we
discuss in Part III, nothing in the Constitution prevents mayors (or any other state officials)
from branding foreign governments and officials as murderers, terrorists, or worse.
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nurtured over time. For example, dozens of states have denounced the geno-
cide of Armenians.27 In contrast, the federal government has refused to use
that precise word in order to avoid upsetting Turkey.28 President Obama’s
decision to refer to “atrocities” instead of “genocide” in a speech commemo-
rating the victims reflects longstanding federal policy and a concern for
Turkish sensitivities.29
Or consider the state legislation at the heart of Arizona v. United States.30
Arizona made it a crime for unauthorized aliens to work in the state, and it
empowered police to arrest persons who they had probable cause to believe
were in the country illegally.31 The law prompted Mexico to take the unusual
step of filing an amicus brief in the Supreme Court.32 In that brief, our
southern neighbor explained that the law “caused long-term harm to Mex-
ico-U.S. relations.”33 Suggesting that the federal government agreed with
that assessment, an American diplomat conceded to the Chinese that the
Arizona statute was a human rights debacle.34
Our third concern arises from the proclivity of states to undermine our
national government’s conduct of foreign affairs. When the states adopt
their own foreign policies, they may sow confusion in the international
arena as to our nation’s stances. This problem can manifest in numerous
ways. The federal government may adopt a foreign policy and assure the
international community of its commitment to it. But dissenting states may
act at cross-purposes to that federal policy.
For instance, the United States policy towards Taiwan (the Republic of
China) is a study in nuance and opacity.35 The idea is to say the minimum
that satisfies the People’s Republic of China (namely, that there is one China
and that we recognize the People’s Republic), while not wholly abandoning
our longtime ally, Taiwan.36 But suppose that individual states, including
27. For a list of states who have officially recognized the Armenian genocide, see US State
Recognition of Armenian Genocide, Armenian Nat’l Committee of Am. (2015), http://
www.anca.org/genocide_resource/states_map.php [https://perma.cc/HZ44-HZJ2].
28. Indeed, Congress has failed to muster the votes for a resolution recognizing the geno-
cide. See H.R. Res. 106, 110th Cong. (2007).
29. See Peter Baker, Obama Marks Genocide Without Saying the Word, N.Y. Times, Apr.
25, 2010, at A10, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/world/europe/25prexy.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/EF5Q-R8JQ].
30. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
31. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497–98.
32. Brief for the United Mexican States, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Ari-
zona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492.
33. Id. at 6.
34. See McCain, Kyl Call on Diplomat to Apologize for Arizona Law Comment to Chinese,
Fox News: Politics (May 19, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/05/19/gop-sena
tors-diplomat-apologize-arizona-law-comment-chinese/ [https://perma.cc/66MG-CDC7].
35. See Shirley A. Kan & Wayne M. Morrison, Cong. Research Serv., R41952, U.S.-
Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues 4 (2013).
36. See Taiwan Relations Act, 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§§ 3301–3316 (2012)) (maintaining cultural, commercial, defense, and other relationships
with Taiwan); see also U.S. Relations with Taiwan, U.S. Dep’t of State (Feb. 12, 2015),
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California, New York and Texas, decided to recognize Taiwan and its preten-
sions to sovereignty over the mainland.37 And imagine further that such
states sought to favor Taiwan, adopting policies that enraged the People’s
Republic. Can anyone doubt that these states could hazard our nation’s rela-
tions with China, leading to heated rhetoric, trade wars, or—more troub-
ling—real ones?
Even when states and the federal government have the same general
stance toward some foreign matter, seemingly minute differences can gener-
ate significant problems. Consider the events leading up to Crosby v. Na-
tional Foreign Trade Council.38 In response to Burma’s suppression of
dissenters, Massachusetts barred state agencies from making purchases from
almost any company doing business in Burma, a rather sweeping law.39 Con-
gress subsequently enacted a more restrained federal response to the sup-
pression, creating some bars on foreign aid and delegating authority to the
president.40 Using that authority, the president barred U.S. persons from
investing in Burma.41
The resultant mess left members of the international community an-
noyed and flummoxed. The state law threatened to derail effective multilat-
eral diplomacy because, by penalizing foreign companies for doing business
with Burma, it effectively punished other nations as well as Burma.42 Many
of our allies formally expressed their displeasure—some even filed com-
plaints with the World Trade Organization alleging that the state act violated
international trade agreements.43 As the European Union (EU) complained
in its Supreme Court amicus brief, the state law “creat[ed] confusion about
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm [https://perma.cc/BP8V-VJ6J] (“[T]here is but one
China and Taiwan is a part of China. . . . [But] the people of the United States will maintain
cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.”).
37. The recent case, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015), held that the president
had the exclusive right to recognize foreign nations and governments. But that exclusivity
rested on the notion that only the president could speak for the nation. The opinion did not
speak to what role, if any, the states may play in recognition. Even if the president alone may
recognize on behalf of the United States, it does not follow that states lack more limited au-
thority to recognize nations and governments. For instance, the California legislature might
have authority to recognize a foreign nation on behalf of the state of California, and not the
United States.
38. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
39. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, §§ 22J, 22H, 22M (2014), invalidated by Crosby, 530 U.S. at
388.
40. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Act,
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-107, § 570, 110 Stat. 704, 747 (1997).
41. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 368–70.
42. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, §§ 22J, 22H, 22M.
43. See Brief for the European Communities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent, Natsios v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (No. 99-474), 2000 WL
177175, at *7.
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which entity speaks for and acts on behalf of American interests.”44 Moreo-
ver, the EU explained, such laws “greatly increase the difficulty of the U.S.
Government to speak consistently and with one voice [in] foreign affairs.”45
Finally, even where state dabbling does not sow international confusion,
it is problematic because the national government actors are elected to con-
duct diplomacy with foreign nations. State actors are not. More precisely,
voters expect that federal officials will handle our international affairs. For
the most part, voters do not elect governors or state legislators in order to
advance human rights in Burma or to determine whether some government
exercises (or should exercise) sovereignty over Palestine, Tibet, or Kashmir.
When state actors condemn genocide, real or imagined, or punish nations
for trading with others, these state officials act outside their bailiwick, at
least as voters understand it.
A few concluding words on the federal separation of powers in foreign
affairs. In arguing for the elimination of state voices, we do not mean to
exaggerate the level of unity at the federal level. Notwithstanding Justice
Sutherland’s discussion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,46
presidents clearly are not the sole voice in foreign affairs. Though the execu-
tive enjoys significant residual authority over foreign affairs via the Vesting
Clause’s grant of executive power,47 Congress may declare war,48 regulate
foreign commerce,49 and proscribe activity that violates the law of nations.50
Hence, Congress enjoys constitutional authority that can be used to embar-
rass or offend nations that the executive wishes to cultivate or court. Relat-
edly, the executive can refuse to enforce Congress’s foreign affairs laws when
he supposes them to be unconstitutional, creating a different sort of federal
discord.51 In sum, the Founders’ Constitution supposed that the federal gov-
ernment would have more than one voice in foreign affairs.
Having said that, foreign relations becomes far more discordant when
we have not two federal actors, but a total of 102 national actors, with 50
state executives and 50 state legislatures adding their distinctive voices to
those of the Congress and the president. That Congress and the executive
may act at cross-purposes in foreign affairs hardly suggests the desirability of
an even more jarring cacophony.
44. Id. at *4.
45. Id. at *10.
46. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (writing that the president has “plenary and exclusive power
. . . as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations”).
47. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. For a historical analysis of what this power might
extend to, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231, 265–72 (2001).
48. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
49. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
50. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
51. For a contemporary exploration of this issue, see Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076
(2015).
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Moreover, some concerns about state intervention are inapplicable at
the federal level, even where Congress and the president are at odds. As
noted, the political branches have expertise that comes from recurring en-
gagement on foreign matters, steady contact with foreign officials, and a
constant supply of intelligence from the State Department and the CIA.
Moreover, foreign nations rightly assume that federal institutions speak for
the nation. Finally, American voters expect federal officials to steward our
foreign affairs. In sum, periodic federal disunity in foreign affairs hardly
undermines the case against the discordant noise stemming from a multi-
tude of state voices.
B. Addressing the One Voice Critics
Scholars who favor a state role in foreign affairs claim either that state
foreign policies generate benefits or that the costs of state foreign policies are
trivial or manageable. We think such assertions are erroneous.
First, consider the assertion that state freelancing benefits the states and
their citizens. Some favor multiple voices in foreign affairs because it allows
states to avoid “collaboration with . . . evil regime[s].”52 As one noted
scholar put it, the Crosby Court’s preemption prevented Massachusetts from
condemning the Burmese atrocities any more harshly than the federal gov-
ernment had—a censure the state may have thought insufficient.53 The ben-
efit realized here is a familiar one, namely greater preference satisfaction
stemming from a federal system.
We admit that suppressing state foreign policies may require Bay Staters
and others to associate with regimes that many may regard as evil. But this
does not trouble us. First, every democracy faces the same issue. For in-
stance, citizens within a state of the Union may be upset with the choices
struck by their state officials, as when a state government seems insuffi-
ciently hostile to some regime. After all, Cambridge or Newton may believe
that the Massachusetts law also was insufficiently hostile to Burma’s govern-
ment. Second, and relatedly, the Constitution replicates the same problem,
for it limits the states in all sorts of ways and authorizes the federal govern-
ment to make treaties with governments that some Americans regard as mis-
guided or evil. The president (with the Senate’s consent) may make a treaty
of alliance with an evil regime, and the dissenters in the states must tolerate
it, for state laws cannot thwart a treaty. Third, Massachusetts has federal
representation and those legislators may cast votes to craft and change fed-
eral policy. The corollary of that representation is that the state ought to
handle political defeat gracefully. When Congress rejects the foreign policy
preferences of a majority of Massachusetts citizens, the state should not be
able to strike out on its own and craft its own foreign policy.
52. Sanford Levinson, Compelling Collaboration with Evil? A Comment on Crosby v. Na-
tional Foreign Trade Council, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2189, 2194 (2001).
53. See id. at 2194–95.
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Another difficulty of this argument is that it leaves to the states the de-
termination of which sovereigns are “evil.” A state may view relations with a
key ally as “collaboration with evil.” What if states had condemned and
sanctioned Stalinist Russia during World War II, or Saudi Arabia in the wake
of the 9/11 attacks? In modern times, a state with a sizable Muslim popula-
tion may disfavor or discriminate against Israel as a show of support to
Hamas or the Palestinian Authority. Or imagine a state with a strong Chris-
tian lobby choosing to speak out vigorously against foreign states that are
insufficiently protective of Christians. However disagreeable its decisions
may be from time to time, the federal government is best circumstanced to
calibrate our relationships with foreign nations and to decide when it is
necessary to make a deal with a devil, perhaps to join forces to oppose a
worse devil, or perhaps to aid a faltering but innocent regime.
Finally, we must keep in mind that the state authority in question does
not merely extend to punishing evil foreign states. State power to conduct
foreign policy can also be wielded to curry favor with heinous or troubling
regimes. As discussed earlier, Idaho collaborated with Libya’s el-Qaddafi.
And today states might court despots like Kim Jong-Un of North Korea or
theocrats like Ali Khamanei of Iran. State autonomy in foreign affairs may
be used to satisfy all sorts of preferences, including base and ignoble ones.
Next, we take up the claim that the nation (as opposed to individual
states) benefits from multiple voices. Some scholars claim that state action
helps overcome federal inertia.54 The supposition is that when individual
states engage in the international arena, they spur the federal government to
further develop and express its own policies and thereby assist the nation.55
One scholar has argued that states prompted federal action against
apartheid.56
The logic of this argument is sound. State action may spark a federal
response when one was lacking. Yet we fail to see why states should set the
foreign policy agenda of federal institutions. The question is which institu-
tions are better positioned to decide the issues that ought to occupy the
federal government’s limited resources. Children can spur parents to take
useful action, but few would suppose that children be trusted with legal
authority to force matters onto the family agenda.57 Similarly, the question is
whether, given the federal government’s conduct of foreign affairs, we want
states to “burden” that exercise58 by helping shape that agenda. We think
not. As we have discussed, states are incompetent actors in the foreign arena
54. Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National Perspective on
the Benefits of State Participation, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1015, 1056–57 (2001).
55. Id. at 1058.
56. Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the “One-Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46
Vill. L. Rev. 975, 995 (2001).
57. If our analogy seems unduly dismissive of the positive role states may play, consider
the employee/management relationship. Employees will generate good ideas and sound man-
agers listen to their various constituencies.  Yet management is ultimately authorized to heed
or rebuff the proposals of employees.
58. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819).
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and are ill-equipped to think strategically either about what international
matters are most important or the havoc their agenda setting may ultimately
cause. A state measure designed to spur federal officials may thrust the na-
tion into stormy waters before a proper federal intervention is feasible or
possible. Sometimes the status quo is the best policy.
Finally this theory seems to assume that the federal government pays
insufficient attention to foreign matters and that a spur to greater considera-
tion would be useful. But we simply do not know the optimal amount of
resources that Congress and the president should devote to foreign affairs.
Indeed, perhaps the political branches already have too much of a foreign
focus. It should be beyond cavil that federal officials must devote significant
resources (personnel, funds, attention) to domestic affairs and therefore
cannot obsess about international matters, much less the particular foreign
concerns of states.
Other scholars contend that states may “produce international good-
will” by complying with international norms that the federal government
fails to follow.59 For instance, in 2005 the Kyoto Protocol went into effect
with the support of 141 ratifying countries.60 Though the United States
never ratified the Protocol,61 many states and localities adopted its recom-
mendations.62 We admit that voluntary state compliance with international
norms may generate goodwill and that it is difficult to conceive how such
compliance may simultaneously harm the nation as a whole.
But we fail to see why we should focus only on the potential for good-
will. Imagine a state dominated by those who believe that the theory of
manmade climate change is hopelessly wrong. In a fit of spite, the state legis-
lature enacts measures designed to increase carbon dioxide emissions. Surely
this would generate ill will overseas, at least amongst foreign nations gravely
concerned about greenhouse gases. Again, our point is that state autonomy
can be used for ill or good. That state autonomy can be used to generate
international goodwill hardly establishes that federalism in foreign affairs is
worth preserving.
As a final point, which we discuss later, Congress can permit multiple
voices in those instances where it believes that the cacophony generates net
international goodwill. The benefits of multiple voices—if there are any—
are not necessarily quashed by our suggestion that one federal voice is gener-
ally better. We simply believe that the political branches should determine
59. David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 953, 1021 (2014).
60. Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and For-
eign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 Emory L.J. 31, 62 (2007).
61. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/
2613.php [https://perma.cc/Z5N3-6BCY] (showing the ratification status of all nations).
62. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 60, at 62 (documenting how “[s]everal cities . . . have
enacted ordinances aimed at conforming to the Protocol’s targets for controlling local utility
emissions”).
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on a case-by-case basis whether state freelancing in foreign affairs is desira-
ble. The current default, where states have some uncertain latitude to act on
the international stage, has it backwards.
We next turn to those who suggest that the costs of cacophony can be
contained or minimized. Consider the assertion that state participation in
foreign affairs is not so problematic because the federal government can dis-
claim responsibility of state actions. One scholar argues that by carefully
explaining when it is constitutionally unable to limit the states’ ability to act,
the federal government can “relieve itself of responsibility” for the impact
that states have in the foreign arena.63 Essentially, this argument calls for the
federal government to explain that the Constitution prohibits it from im-
peding the states. As we understand it, the following example captures the
argument’s logic. Reconsider the facts of Crosby, where Massachusetts lim-
ited state agency purchases from firms doing business in Burma. This policy
vexed our allies, as it adversely affected their companies. If the United States
had simply told the international community that it had no means of sup-
pressing the Massachusetts legislation, the theory supposes that foreign na-
tions would not have had a grievance against the United States.
As we explain in Part III, this theory of federal fecklessness gets the
Constitution wrong. The federal government may strip the states of their
retained authorities in the foreign arena. Moreover, some foreign states are
familiar with federal systems64 and will perhaps recognize that in such sys-
tems, the central government often has plenary authority over foreign af-
fairs, making claims of federal fecklessness implausible.
Other scholars respond that inflamed nations have the capacity to retali-
ate selectively, and target only the offending American state.65 This argument
assumes that because “the [American] states have become discretely depen-
dent on the global economy, they are now also discretely subject to its
discipline.”66
Yet while it is true that foreign governments may selectively retaliate
against rogue American states, nothing prevents foreign nations from retali-
ating against the United States rather than a particular state of the union.
Indeed, foreign states may suppose that it is more practical to retaliate
against the entire United States and that they are more likely to get results
should they punish the entire nation. After all, the more people harmed by
the retaliation, the more pressure will be brought to bear to reverse the of-
fending state policy. Relatedly, the strategy of selective retaliation may fail,
63. Porterfield, supra note 6, at 47–48.
64. Major international actors including Russia, India, and Germany employ federal sys-
tems of government. See The World Factbook: Government Type, Cent. Intelligence Agency
(Mar. 5, 2016) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html
[https://www.perma.cc/3ZRE-EGZL].
65. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1223, 1259–70
(1999).
66. Id. at 1261.
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insofar as states lack a cadre of experienced officials and the ability to con-
clude international agreements. “[T]he individual American states neither
send ambassadors to nor receive ambassadors from any foreign country and
do not make treaties or international trade agreements,”67 making it harder
to negotiate with them and de-escalate tensions. Moreover, any compact
with a foreign nation must be approved by Congress,68 a fact that will cause
many foreign states to suppose that leverage ought to be brought to bear
against Congress and the president since they are the ultimate
decisionmakers.
Moreover, even if foreign states pursue targeted retaliation, they may
rationally retaliate against an innocent American state. Suppose a foreign
sovereign has little or no leverage against the American state that has antag-
onized it, but nonetheless retaliates against a state over which it does have
leverage. A Mississippi law discriminating against Canadian businesses may
enrage our northern ally. Ottawa may reasonably conclude that it has no
carrots or sticks with which to influence Mississippi, but that it has plenty at
its disposal vis-à-vis New York. Canadians may suppose that New York, the
more powerful state, will wield sufficient influence in the halls of Congress
to ensure the preemption of the Mississippi act. Here, the Canadian govern-
ment engaged in the kind of targeted retaliation that some critics of the one
voice theory posit, but it harmed an innocent state.
In sum, the strategies of disclaiming responsibility for state actions and
trusting that the other nation will engage in targeted retaliation should not
inspire any confidence. The former is legally incorrect, for Congress can bar
offensive state laws. The latter strategy rests entirely on speculation about
how foreign states may choose to respond. The United States cannot force
another nation to train its ire upon a rogue American state as opposed to an
innocent state or the entire United States.
II. Haphazard Judicial Preemption of the Cacophony
We have argued that the nation should speak with one voice, yet have
said little about why prevailing mechanisms are inadequate. At present, the
courts stand as the principal institutional check on state interference with
foreign affairs. Under the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution, laws, and
treaties of the United States trump contrary state law.
Though the judiciary is generally seen as passive, we believe it has been
overly active in this area, preempting state laws based on highly dubious
readings of the three types of federal laws. Its keenness for preemption likely
stems from a (justified) sense that the United States should stand united on
matters of foreign affairs. As much as we agree with the policy impulse, we
believe that courts act outside their bailiwick when such concerns motivate
their decisions.
67. Brief for the European Communities, supra note 43, at *4.
68. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (stating that “[n]o State shall . . . enter into any Agree-
ment or Compact . . . with a foreign Power” without the consent of Congress).
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Besides its general eagerness to preempt, the judiciary has proven a less
than ideal institution for constraining state forays into the international
arena. Courts are ill-equipped to decide whether the states have interfered
too much with the federal government’s foreign policies. First, the courts act
ex post and respond sluggishly to state intrusions. But often, foreign policy
requires ex ante rules and speed. Second, the courts are incompetent actors
in this arena. They cannot evaluate whether the states have interfered with
the federal conduct of foreign affairs, for, very much like the states they
censure, the courts lack the information and expertise necessary to judge the
matter. Finally, perhaps because of courts’ inexperience, their preemption
jurisprudence is capricious. Sometimes the courts read federal law narrowly,
preempting little. Other times, they sweep away state law in implausible and
misguided ways. This vacillation sacrifices predictability and leaves all con-
fused as to what the states may do in foreign affairs.
Below, we group Supreme Court preemption of state laws into four cat-
egories: dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, so-called Dormant Foreign Af-
fairs, executive, and statutory and treaty. In each context, the courts have
proven too willing to preempt state law, often based on no more than a
vague sense that states have intruded too far into foreign affairs.
A. Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
The first category for preempting the states in foreign affairs is the dor-
mant Foreign Commerce Clause. Courts have long supposed that the Inter-
state Commerce Clause has a “dormant” aspect, meaning that they read the
Clause as preempting state laws even in the absence of affirmative federal
legislation. After some justices suggested that states could not regulate inter-
state commerce at all, the courts now apply an analysis that turns on
whether state law facially discriminates against interstate commerce. If the
law facially discriminates against such commerce, the law will only be up-
held if the state can “show that it advances a legitimate local purpose that
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”69
Nondiscriminatory statutes that regulate interstate commerce will be upheld
unless the burdens on interstate commerce are “clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits.”70
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles the Court distinguished the
reach of the dormant Commerce Clause from the dormant foreign Com-
merce Clause, noting that the latter requires “a more extensive constitutional
inquiry.”71 Japan Line concerned a California state tax applied to Japanese
69. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1994)
(quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279 (1988)).
70. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
71. 441 U.S. 434, 445–46 (1979). Notably, the Court made no reference to the possibility
of federal exclusivity in this domain.
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shipping containers present in the state on a given date. Because the contain-
ers were already subject to Japanese taxes,72 California’s law subjected for-
eign commerce to a risk of double taxation that domestic commerce did not
share.73 As one might expect, the state statute drew the ire of many impor-
tant trading partners.74
The Court invalidated the law, observing that two additional considera-
tions surface when a state seeks to tax articles of foreign commerce. First, the
possibility of multiple taxation becomes relevant. Second, a court must dis-
cern whether a state tax on a foreign article impairs federal uniformity.75
California’s tax clearly implicated the first factor. Further, concluding that
the federal government sought to remove impediments to the use of ship-
ping containers in foreign commerce, the Court held that the tax under-
mined federal uniformity and impaired the national government’s ability to
speak with one voice.76
Subsequent case law reveals the malleability of these factors. In
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, the Court considered
whether a California income tax applied to a multi-national company based
on the percentage of its global operations that occurred in-state, was tailored
to satisfy the Japan Line inquiry.77 The Court found multiple taxation78 and
that the federal government “seem[ed] to prefer the taxing method adopted
by” the foreign countries over California’s.79 Nonetheless, the Court found
the tax permissible.80 To distinguish Japan Line, the Court contrasted laws
that have acceptable “foreign resonances” with those that improperly “impli-
cate foreign affairs.”81 According to the Court, laws in the latter category
involve “foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal
Government.”82
Not surprisingly, this distinction has proven elusive. One might suppose
that where the federal executive disapproves of some state law’s effect on
foreign affairs, it would follow that the statute must “implicate foreign af-
fairs” and hence be struck down. Yet the Court has found state laws permis-
sible even where there is clear executive branch disapproval.83 Moreover, the
72. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 436–38.
73. Id. at 453.
74. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 434.
75. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451–53.
76. Id. at 452–54.
77. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
78. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 187 (“[S]ome of the income taxed without apportion-
ment by foreign nations as attributable to appellant’s foreign subsidiaries was also taxed by
California as attributable to the State’s share of the total income of the unitary business of
which those subsidiaries are a part.”).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 196–97.
81. Id. at 194.
82. Id.
83. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 328–30 (1994)
(finding that congressional acquiescence to the state action was sufficient, notwithstanding
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Court’s application of its own test is inconsistent with the outcomes it seeks
to avoid. For instance, in Container Corp. the Court noted that the most
troublesome and obvious way in which a state tax law could implicate for-
eign affairs is where it causes foreign trading partners to retaliate against the
United States. Yet despite the presence of such retaliation in a later dormant
foreign commerce case—Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of Cali-
fornia84—the Court found no preemption.
This judicial line drawing is disconcerting. It invites the courts to be
arbiters of a fatuous distinction, namely whether a state action has a tolera-
ble “foreign resonance” or whether it intolerably “implicate[s] foreign af-
fairs.” Because there is no real test here, we believe that the distinction turns
on nothing more than whether the Court thinks state law interferes too
much with federal foreign policy. If it does, it implicates foreign affairs. If
not, it is a mere resonance.
One need not look far to uncover criticism of the Court’s approach.85
After the Court announced its “test” in Container Corp., it immediately (and
candidly) acknowledged its own limited competence.86
This Court has little competence in determining precisely when foreign
nations will be offended by particular acts, and even less competence in
deciding how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign
right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please.87
Exactly. In struggling to distinguish tolerable foreign affairs resonances
from intolerable foreign affairs implications, the Court finds itself crafting,
refining, and discarding senseless distinctions. The dormant foreign com-
merce clause, like the dormant Commerce Clause, lacks a sound textual
foundation because the grant of commerce authority to Congress does not
necessarily bar state regulation of the same commerce.88 The judiciary’s
move to add extra bite to the dormant Commerce Clause test as a means of
being more protective of foreign commerce merely reflects a judicial policy
choice to show greater solicitude for foreign commerce.
executive disapproval, to determine that the nation’s ability to speak with one-voice had not
been undermined).
84. 512 U.S. 298; see Todd Cameron Taylor, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board:
The Need for Judicial Restraint in Foreign Commerce Clause Analysis, 20 N.C. J. Int’l. L. &
Com. Reg. 329, 330 nn.11–12 (1995).
85. Scholars have also been critical. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Undersea World of
Foreign Relations Federalism, 2 Chi. J. Int’l L. 337, 347 (2001) (mocking the dichotomy be-
tween laws that have foreign resonances and those that implicate foreign affairs).
86. Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Leanne M. Wilson, The Fate of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause after
Garamendi and Crosby, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 746, 777 (2007) (“The dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause . . . lacks textual support . . . .”)
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B. Dormant Foreign Affairs
Having concluded that the grant of commerce authority to Congress
could preempt state regulation of commerce, perhaps it was only a matter of
time before the Court read the grants of foreign affairs authority as preemp-
tive. That moment came more than a century and a half after the Constitu-
tion’s creation.
Zschernig v. Miller invalidated a state act in the absence of any relevant
federal statute or treaty.89 At issue was an Oregon statute that largely oper-
ated to bar citizens of communist countries from inheriting property of in-
state decedents. The case concerned the estate of a resident who died intes-
tate, and whose only heirs were resident citizens of East Germany. Oregon’s
statute provided that the deceased’s property escheated to the state unless
the heirs satisfied certain requirements. Heirs needed to show that their
home country permitted a reciprocal right of inheritance, one free of any
governmental confiscation.90 It is no stretch to conclude that the state had
“establish[ed] its own foreign policy.”91 The law was a “foray by Oregon into
Cold War politics.”92
In striking down the law, the Court noted that even in the absence of a
federal law or treaty, “a State’s policy may [unacceptably] disturb foreign
relations.”93 The Court went on to assert that the Oregon law had “a direct
impact upon foreign relations and may well [have] adversely affected the
power of the central government to deal with those problems.”94 Essentially,
Zschernig demands the invalidation of state laws that disturb or adversely
affect the federal government’s ability to conduct foreign affairs.95
As a normative matter, we consider the outcome correct, for we do not
believe that states should be able to discriminate against foreign nations. Yet
Zschernig’s reasoning leaves much to be desired. Most troublingly, the Court
found preemption based on the idea that the Constitution implicitly barred
state action that “disturb[s]” our nation’s foreign affairs.96 Yet there is a
compelling argument that the courts have no license to sit in judgment of
state law in this way. Because Article I, Section 10 carefully preempts only
certain state involvement in foreign affairs,97 there is no warrant for reading
89. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). The Zschernig Court did not coin this descriptive phrase, but it
has since been used as a shorthand for the court’s conclusion that “ ‘even in [the] absence of a
treaty’ or federal statute, a state may violate the constitution by ‘establish[ing] its own foreign
policy.’ ” Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441).
90. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430–31.
91. Id. at 441.
92. Ramsey, supra note 14, at 356.
93. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 14, at 357 (“Zschernig found a constitutional limitation
on state laws that ‘impair the effective exercise’ of federal foreign policy.”).
96. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441.
97. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
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the Constitution as if it also contained a hidden generic “dormant” foreign
affairs preemption principle. Rather, whether the states have unduly inter-
fered with the foreign affairs powers of the political branches is a matter for
those branches to decide upon and, if need be, remedy.
In Zschernig, the executive had conceded that the Oregon act had no
impact on the nation’s conduct of foreign affairs.98 Yet the Court never ex-
plained why the executive branch’s expertise was irrelevant to the question
of whether the state law interfered with foreign affairs. In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Potter Stewart explained that “so fundamental a constitutional
issue cannot vary from day to day with the shifting winds at the State De-
partment.”99 We cannot help but wonder whether “shifting winds” at the
Supreme Court are a better means of judging when a state has interfered
with the federal conduct of foreign affairs, even if gauging such interference
is the provenance of the judiciary.
Finally, scholars have rightly questioned the doctrine’s workability.
Zschernig requires courts to evaluate interference with federal prerogatives,
but leaves them with absolutely no guidance. How much state involvement is
too much? What distinguishes acceptable participation from unacceptable
disruption?100 The Court never said. Moreover, the judiciary is hardly
equipped to judge whether a state law has disturbed a foreign nation. As the
Court would later admit, it “has little competence in determining precisely
when foreign nations will be offended by particular acts.”101 As one scholar
put it, Zschernig sanctions “judicial intrusion into a political arena”102—a
forum where judges are unqualified and out of their element. In our view,
judicial intervention ineluctably leads to inconsistent and unprincipled ap-
plication of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.103
More recently, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council104 hinted that
the Court recognizes that Zschernig is problematic. There, both the trial and
appellate courts applied Zschernig and the dormant foreign affairs preemp-
tion doctrine to find Massachusetts’s Burma sanctions preempted.105 Yet the
Supreme Court rested preemption on an implausibly broad reading of a
98. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6 n.5, Zschernig, 389 U.S. 429.
99. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
100. Compare Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433 (noting that no one suggests that states are for-
bidden from taking actions that might have a remote possibility of disturbing a foreign na-
tion), with id. at 441 (noting, with disapproval, that state action may disturb foreign nations).
101. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
102. Bilder, supra note 6, at 830.
103. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1395, 1396 (1999).
104. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
105. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 1999), aff’d sub nom.
Crosby, 530 U.S. 363 (“[W]e agree with the district court that the Massachusetts Burma Law is
unconstitutional under Zschernig.”); Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287,
290–91 (D. Mass. 1998), aff’d sub nom. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (explaining that the Massachusetts
Burma Law “unconstitutionally impinges on the federal government’s exclusive authority to
regulate foreign affairs”).
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federal act—not Zschernig’s dormant foreign affairs doctrine.106 As Jack
Goldsmith has argued, the Court’s failure to revisit Zschernig in the context
of its hyper-aggressive reading of a federal statute suggests that the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine is so “illegitimate that it requires masking.”107 In
other words, dormant foreign affairs preemption lives on, albeit in the guise
of statutory preemption.
Zschernig is something of an embarrassment. For close to fifty years, the
Court has never relied on it again. Yet lower courts have. Consider Tayyari v.
New Mexico State University.108 Tayyari concerned a New Mexico State Uni-
versity regulation that barred the enrollment of “any student whose home
government holds, or permits the holding” of U.S. hostages.109 Its events
took place during the Iranian hostage crisis. The court’s preemption analysis
turned on whether the regulation impermissibly “interfere[d] with federal
immigration policy and federal foreign policy.”110 In finding that it did in-
terfere, the court indicated “[t]he potential effect on international relations
vis-a-vis Iran is much greater here than with a regulation affecting all aliens
regardless of nationality,” and “the action by [the state] impose[d] an im-
permissible burden on the federal government’s power to . . . conduct for-
eign affairs” and thus its ability to resolve the crisis in Iran.111
The former statement is odd. By its terms the regulation did apply to all
aliens regardless of nationality—it was not Irano-centric.112 As for imper-
missible burden, the court pointed to an amicus brief and to a federal regu-
lation requiring Iranian students to report to the Immigration and
Nationalization Service (INS) for student visa validation, to demonstrate
that the state rule impeded the federal government’s ability to conduct our
nation’s foreign affairs.113 As the basis for invalidating state law, this analysis
leaves much to be desired.
Given continuing state forays into foreign affairs and cases like Tayyari,
there remains the distinct possibility that the Court might yet return to the
106. In fact, the Supreme Court only mentioned Zschernig once in the entire Crosby opin-
ion as a means of explaining what guided the decisions below. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 371 (“[The
lower courts] found the state Act unconstitutionally interfered with the foreign affairs power
of the National Government under Zschernig.”).
107. Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 175, 221;
see also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 1259, 1304 (2001)
(“Crosby is virtually a dormant foreign affairs case in disguise.”).
108. 495 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.M. 1980).
109. Tayyari, 495 F. Supp. at 1368.
110. Id. at 1376.
111. Id. at 1380.
112. A caveat is probably in order here; while the state’s regulations did not specifically
identify Iran, they did state that the prohibition on enrolling aliens of relevant nationalities
would be lifted if “American hostages are returned unharmed by July 15, 1980.” Id. at 1368. Of
course, the only foreign sovereign in a position to return American hostages by this date was
Iran. So, while the state regulations did not specifically identify Iran, it is rather clear that the
Iran hostage crisis was the impetus for the provisions. To us, the court’s approach is unpersua-
sive either way.
113. Id. at 1378–79.
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Zschernig notion that the Constitution implicitly preempts state interference
in foreign affairs and that the courts may judge what constitutes
interference.
C. Executive
The first two categories of preemption involved reading the Constitu-
tion as implicitly barring certain state laws. The third category rests on the
conclusion that the Constitution authorizes the executive to preempt state
law outside the context of treaties or laws.
The Court first took this step in the early part of the 20th century, read-
ing executive agreements as if they could preempt state law. In United States
v. Pink and United States v. Belmont, the Court read the Litvinov Assignment
recognizing Russia to preempt inconsistent state law.114 In Dames & Moore v.
Regan, the Court read President Carter’s agreement with Iran to preempt
state law claims, citing Pink and Belmont as justification.115 Thus modern
doctrine imagines that the executive, via sole executive agreements with for-
eign nations, may preempt state law, at least to some extent.
The problem with this view is that the Supremacy Clause does not list
sole executive agreements as preempting inconsistent state law. As Michael
Ramsey has observed, the Constitution never grants executive agreements
any preemptive effect, for the Supremacy Clause only lists the Constitution,
treaties, and statutes.116 In other words, the president seems to lack any con-
stitutionally-granted power to preempt state law, whether by executive
agreement or otherwise. If the president wants to preempt state law, he
needs to get Congress to pass legislation or the Senate to pass a treaty. At
least that is what the Constitution’s text suggests.
Consistent with that view, for much of the first century of the Republic,
executive agreements were never treated as if they could alter domestic law—
state or federal.117 While treaties were published along with acts of Congress
in the statutes at large, executive agreements enjoyed no such treatment.118
There presumably was no need for their dissemination precisely because
they could not alter domestic law.
114. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937).
115. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
116. See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L.
Rev. 133, 218–35 (1998). To argue otherwise is to suppose that “treaties” mean one thing for
the purposes of the president’s Article II powers, and another in the Supremacy Clause. Id. at
220. The argument would need to suppose that, while the president requires the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate to make Treaties for purpose of Article II, Article VI’s
reference to Treaties as supreme law of the land would encompass acts (such as executive
agreements) that are not subject to Article II’s requirements.
117. Id. at 229–31.
118. Id. at 231 n.384.
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In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the Court further em-
powered the executive to preempt state law.119 Garamendi concerned a Cali-
fornia statute (the Holocaust Victims Insurance Relief Act, or HVIRA) that
required all insurance companies doing business in the state to disclose the
details of policies that such companies had sold to persons in Europe be-
tween 1920 and 1945.120 HVIRA’s purpose was clear: to promote payment
on insurance claims owed to Holocaust victims. There was, however, an ex-
ecutive agreement between the United States and various European parties,
including Germany, geared toward a lasting resolution of all Holocaust
claims.121 As the Court explained, the president’s agreement made a com-
mitment to discourage litigation against insurers who sold policies encom-
passed by the California act.122
Though the Court discussed Zschernig,123 it ultimately carved out an en-
tirely new doctrine, one that went beyond anything before it. The Court
could not rest upon the executive agreement’s terms because it did not pur-
port to preempt state law. Nonetheless, the Court found that executive pol-
icy, as implicitly expressed through “valid executive agreements [could]
preempt state law.”124
We agree that the states have no business targeting companies based on
their conduct abroad. Absent federal approval or authorization, the states
should not meddle in foreign affairs. Yet there is much to criticize in
Garamendi. Even if one supposes that executive agreements may preempt,
Garamendi is problematic because it extended the preemptive effect of exec-
utive agreements into domains where their conflict with state law was rather
questionable. As the dissent noted, this was the first case in which the Court
found executive agreement preemption by implication.125
Furthermore, the executive agreement at issue evinced absolutely no dis-
approval of state disclosure laws.126 Nonetheless the Court discerned a “suffi-
ciently clear conflict” with executive foreign policy to find preemption of
HVIRA.127 Given that the executive agreement was silent about insurance
disclosure laws, the Court seemed to be applying little more than a variant
of Zschernig. The Court, believing that California had disturbed the execu-
tive’s stewardship of foreign affairs, found the implications of the executive
agreement preempted state law.
In reading an executive agreement to implicitly preempt state insurance
disclosure laws when the agreement said nothing about such disclosure, the
119. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
120. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401.
121. Id. at 406–07.
122. Id. at 406–12.
123. Id. at 417–19.
124. Id. at 416–17.
125. Id. at 440 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing against “implied preemption by execu-
tive agreement” (emphasis added)).
126. See id. at 430.
127. Id. at 420 (majority opinion).
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Court went out of its way to gauge when state action impermissibly intrudes
into foreign affairs. The judicial intervention, grounded on its amateurish
sense of foreign affairs, reflected poorly on the Court.
D. Preemption via Statutes and Treaties
Thus far we have largely focused on the Court’s recourse to dubious
readings of the Constitution as a means of discovering authority to preempt
state actions in foreign affairs. While these cases are the most troubling, the
Court’s faults extend beyond them. Even when the Court preempts via more
conventional mechanisms—treaties and statutes—it often adopts unpersua-
sively broad readings of them. In so doing, it applies a more jaundiced eye
towards state law, at least where foreign affairs is at stake. In our view, the
Court thereby circles back to the inquiry that undergirds this entire area: In
the Court’s estimation, does this state law interfere with foreign affairs too
much?
Return to Crosby. As discussed, Crosby invalidated Massachusetts’s
Burma statute based on its supposed conflict with a federal statute. The
Court declined to apply its presumption against the preemption of state
law,128 and found preemption through a curious analysis. First, the Court
noted that Congress had vested the president with “as much discretion . . . as
our law will admit” in dealing with Burma.129 According to the Court, “[i]t
is simply implausible that Congress would have gone to such lengths to em-
power the President if it had been willing to compromise his effectiveness by
deference to every provision of state [law].”130 Second, the Court noted that
the state law had a much broader reach than the federal one, barring certain
actions and applying to actors that Congress’s act did not.131 That the laws
“share[d] the same goals and . . . [that] compl[iance] with both sets of re-
strictions” was possible did not matter.132 Finally, the Court found that the
law impeded Congress’s directive that the president establish a “comprehen-
sive, multilateral strategy.”133 This is because the act “compromise[d] the
very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice.”134
The first and third reasons are duplicative. Essentially, the Court ob-
served that Congress vested the president with tremendous power to deal
with Burma. But, despite its authority to do so, the executive branch “had
taken no formal action intended to preempt the Massachusetts law” a fact
that the Court seemed to treat as irrelevant.135 In any event, the fact that
128. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000).
129. Id. at 375–76.
130. Id. at 376.
131. Id. at 378–80.
132. Id. at 379.
133. Id. at 380, 385.
134. Id. at 381.
135. Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs
Exception, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 139, 171 (2001).
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Congress vested the president with broad discretion hardly suggests that the
statute itself preempted state law. The Court’s second reason, while more
conventional, is still unpersuasive. The federal law did no more than “set out
an array of . . . sanctions, with no explicit indication that those sanctions
were meant to be exclusive.”136 And given the Court’s conclusion that the
laws shared common goals and that private actors could comply with both,
why it nonetheless concluded that the federal statute’s narrow terms and
scope should be read to preempt a broader state statute is a mystery.
Ernest Young observes that state laws that touch upon foreign affairs are
subtly subject to “the application of different preemption rules—in particu-
lar, rules that are more likely to result in the displacement of state regula-
tion.”137 We agree with this diagnosis. As Carlos Manuel Vázquez suggests,
Crosby was basically a “dormant foreign affairs case in disguise.”138
Across all these foreign affairs preemption doctrines, the same themes
recur. The Court preempts state law whenever it supposes that the states
have interfered with the federal government’s stewardship of foreign affairs
or whenever the states are disturbing foreign affairs. We do not quarrel with
the policy behind the impulse. To the contrary, we wholeheartedly concur
that the states should not interfere with the political branches and that states
should not disturb our nation’s foreign relations. We merely deny that the
inconsistent application of vague doctrines by judges who usually lack any
sort of foreign policy pedigree is the optimal (or even a sound) way of polic-
ing the states. Courts should not capriciously and belatedly wade neck deep
into foreign policy and expound from on high, seizing on penumbras ema-
nating from the Constitution, treaties, statutes, executive agreements, and
executive policy to preempt state law.
From a system-design perspective, no one crafting a constitution would
embrace this approach. Can’t we harness our nation’s foreign policy experts
to preempt state laws that upset our nation’s foreign affairs? There must be a
better way.
III. Three Principles of Foreign Affairs Federalism
Fortunately, there is. As we discuss here, and illustrate in Part IV, Con-
gress may craft preemption regimes that take authority out of the courts’
hands, with Congress preempting state law or delegating preemption deci-
sions to executive experts. The Constitution makes such a system possible
and Congress and the president ought to embrace it, with the courts tact-
fully receding into the background.
To see how the Constitution permits such a system of nonjudicial polic-
ing of state interventions in foreign affairs, this Part discusses how our for-
eign affairs Constitution incorporates three overarching federalism
136. Id. at 172.
137. Id. at 141.
138. Vázquez, supra note 107, at 1304.
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principles.139 First, it assumes that states retain some powers in international
affairs, meaning that the Constitution itself does not require that the states
stand united on foreign matters. Next, notwithstanding the first principle,
the Constitution never guarantees the states any foreign affairs powers; it
establishes no “states’ rights” in foreign relations. Third, and for our pur-
poses most importantly, the Constitution empowers Congress to completely
oust the states from foreign affairs. Hence, though the Constitution does not
of its own terms preclude a dis–United States in the international arena, it
empowers Congress to ensure that the United States actually stands united.
We lay out the case for each principle in the subparts that follow. But to
fully perceive these embedded rules, we must bear in mind the system that
predated the Constitution and the difficulties that the latter was designed to
remedy.
One of the impetuses for the Philadelphia Convention was the sense
that the existing foreign affairs regime was defective. That regime, estab-
lished by the Articles of Confederation, suffered from a trio of foreign affairs
deficiencies: an absence of adequate legislative authority; an incapacity to
prevent or curb state “infractions of treaties or of the law of nations”;140 and
a feeble and ineffective executive. As Edmund Randolph observed in his ad-
dress to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, these failings meant that the
Articles contained no check against states that may, “by their conduct, pro-
voke [foreign] war without control.”141
The dearth of legislative authority in foreign affairs was plain. While the
Continental Congress had power to raise an army, this power was more
imaginary than real because Congress had to rely upon balky states to heed
congressional requisitions.142 Moreover, as Randolph had noted, Congress
could not punish violations of the laws of nations, meaning that it was help-
less as states (and individuals) jeopardized our international standing.143 Fi-
nally, Congress could not regulate foreign commerce.144 After all, the Articles
“expressly delegated” neither power.145
While Congress could make commercial treaties, those treaties were ju-
dicially unenforceable.146 In a sense, the federal government could do little
139. One might add a fourth, largely uncontroversial proposition, namely that the Consti-
tution does not grant the states any power in foreign affairs. This is in keeping with the general
thrust of the Constitution. It endows the federal government and only rarely seeks to empower
the states. A conspicuous exception might be the power to conduct federal elections, discussed
in Article I, Section 4. But even that provision can be read as assuming state power to create
rules and imposing a federal obligation upon the states to establish the time, place, and man-
ner of federal elections.
140. See 1 Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 17, at 19.
141. Id.
142. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957,
1964–65 (1993).
143. See 1 Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 17, at 19.
144. See Articles of Confederation of 1781, arts. II, IX.
145. Id.
146. See Ramsey, supra note 14, at 380–81.
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more than make “recommendations” to the states concerning treaties.147 Un-
surprisingly, Congress was unable to “persuade the states that the national
interest took precedence over local political considerations.”148 For instance,
many states did not honor the Treaty of Paris’s command to erect “no lawful
impediment” to British creditors’ recovery of debts.149 America’s failure to
honor its obligations prompted the British to hold on to its outposts in the
western United States.150
The structural shortcomings compounded the problems, for the confed-
eration had an ineffective plural executive. Many supposed that Congress,
“as a multi-member [executive] body, was not up to the task” of exercising
its foreign affairs power.151 “Congress could not keep secrets; it could not act
expeditiously; [and] it could not pursue a consistent policy.”152 Relatedly,
the lack of a unitary executive made accountability particularly difficult.153
As John Jay—the Secretary of Foreign Affairs—put it, the Continental Con-
gress was not up to the task of wielding executive authority because it “could
not act with secrecy, dispatch, or responsibility.”154
The inadequacies of the American regime in foreign affairs were notori-
ous, even in Europe. For instance, the British and Spanish were indisposed
to strike trade deals, believing they had little to gain.155 As one American put
it, “the feebleness of our general government” was such that “foreign powers
openly declare their unwillingness to treat with” America.156
Legislative impotency, an ineffectual treaty power, and a divided and
inattentive executive meant “states could (and did) establish foreign policies
in competition with Congress.”157 When it came to foreign affairs, the
“United States of America,” an entity nominally recognized by the Articles of
Confederation, stood disunited in aspects of foreign affairs.
Given these difficulties, as well as others, the impetus in 1787 was to
fortify the central government. As Alexander Hamilton would later put it,
the “disposition in the [Philadelphia] convention [was] to disembarrass and
reinforce” national supremacy.158 The Constitution that emerged from the
147. See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 47, at 276–77.
148. See Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive
History of the Continental Congress 343 (1979).
149. 26 Journals of the Continental Congress 26 (photo. reprint 2005) (1928).
150. Rakove, supra note 148, at 343. This state of affairs confounded even the most ar-
dent critics of federal power. George Mason, for instance, found state obstruction of British
creditors “indefensible.” Id. at 344.
151. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 47, at 273.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 277–78.
155. See 9 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 836
(John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990).
156. Id.
157. Ramsey, supra note 14, at 381.
158. 6 The Works of Alexander Hamilton 188 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904).
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Convention proved Hamilton right. It created a unitary executive with a
long horizon,159 partially neutralizing complaints about an amateurish and
incompetent plural executive. It granted Congress new powers over foreign
commerce160 and violations of the laws of nations.161 To guard against em-
barrassments from state treaty violations, the latter were made “supreme
Law of the Land”162 thereby making it clear that federal and state courts
could enforce treaties as law.
As we discuss below, despite the Constitution’s more effectual investi-
ture of foreign affairs powers in the federal government,163 it did not estab-
lish foreign relations as an exclusively national enclave. States could continue
to dabble in foreign affairs because the Constitution did not bar such dab-
bling. And yet, the Constitution never granted states an irrevocable right to
establish their own foreign policies. In fact, the Constitution empowers Con-
gress to oust states from foreign affairs.
A. The Retained Foreign Relations Powers of the States
Although the Supreme Court has from time to time claimed that the
states have no authority over foreign affairs, it has, for the most part, shied
away from the assertion’s sweeping implications.164 Like many who have
considered the subject,165 we think it evident that the Constitution’s default
rule is that the states retain and may exercise some foreign affairs powers.
159. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The Executive power shall be vested in a
President.”).
160. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations”).
161. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power to “define and punish . . . Offences
against the Law of Nations”).
162. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
163. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 47, at 236 (“The Constitution’s text supplies a
sound, comprehensive framework of foreign affairs powers.”).
164. Compare Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941) (holding that the states’ powers
in this sphere are “restricted to the narrowest of limits,” but not eliminated entirely), and
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (remarking that decisions
touching on international relations are a “delicate, plenary, and exclusive power of the Presi-
dent”), with Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (tolerating a state’s utter disregard for
federal foreign policies).
165. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation
of International Law, 111 Harv. L. Rev 2260, 2267 (1998) (“The most natural inference from
. . . the Constitution is that all foreign relations powers not denied to the states by Article I,
Section 10 fall within the concurrent authority of the state and federal governments until the
political branches act to preempt state authority.”); Ramsey, supra note 14, at 346 (“[S]tate
laws interfering with federal foreign policy should stand despite that interference, unless pre-
empted in the ordinary constitutional manner.”).
Having said this, we note that many scholars have argued that the federal government’s
power is indeed exclusive. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural
Reinterpretation, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1298 (1996) (“[T]he Constitution[ ] allocat[es] . . .
exclusive authority over foreign affairs to the federal government.”); Joseph B. Crace, Jr., Note,
Gara-Mending the Doctrine of Foreign Affairs Preemption, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 203, 229–30
(2004) (suggesting that comments from Madison and Hamilton in the Federalist Papers reflect
76 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:47
Consider the Declaration of Independence’s avowal that the “United
Colonies” were “Free and Independent States” with “full Power to levy War,
conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other
Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do,” a locution that
intimated that each state had powers in foreign affairs.166 Consider also the
Articles of Confederation, which, though it constrained the foreign affairs
powers of the states in various ways, never completely barred them from the
international arena. In the language of modern preemption cases, the Arti-
cles lacked any hint that it “field preempted” the states in foreign affairs. To
the contrary, by barring certain state interventions in foreign affairs167 and
by further declaring that the states retained all those powers not expressly
delegated to the Continental Congress,168 the Articles fairly proved that the
“free and independent” States, referenced in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, retained those foreign relations powers not so barred.
This context helps us discern whether, and to what extent, the Constitu-
tion modified this default. The Constitution’s text repeatedly signals that
states continued to retain some authority in foreign affairs, albeit with some
changes. To begin with, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 absolutely bars trea-
ties, alliances, confederations, and letters of marque and reprisal.169 By abso-
lutely prohibiting only some of the most significant exercises of power in this
arena, this provision is best read to imply that the states retain whatever
foreign affairs powers not proscribed. After all, there is no need to bar the
states from exercising powers that they lack in the first instance.
that “the Framers intended the federal government to be the sole organ of foreign policy”);
Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, States’ Rights and Foreign Policy: Some Things Should
Be Left to Washington, Foreign Aff., Jan./Feb. 2000, at 9, 12 (arguing that “[i]t is hardly
credible to look at the Constitution’s assignment of power and its proscriptions on state in-
volvement in foreign affairs and to argue that, absent an express ban” the states were free to
involve themselves in foreign affairs); Sandra L. Lynch, The United States, the States, and For-
eign Relations, 33 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 217, 222 (2000) (arguing that the Constitution’s grants
of power to the federal government over foreign affairs have been understood “from the earli-
est days of our country . . . to embody the principle that power over foreign affairs is vested
exclusively in the federal government”).
Most of these scholars rely upon two quotes from the Federalist Papers. See Ramsey,
supra note 14, at 382–85 (making this observation). Yet, as Michael Ramsey has persuasively
shown, when viewed in context, Hamilton and Madison seem to assert no more than federal
supremacy in foreign affairs. See id. at 383–88. Moreover, because the Constitution does not
expressly preclude the states from foreign affairs in all respects, one would have to suppose
that both gentlemen supposed that the Constitution implicitly barred the states. But Hamilton,
at least, did not read the Constitution in this manner. As he explained, the Constitution only
implicitly bars the states where it “grant[s] an authority to the Union to which a similar
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.” The Fed-
eralist No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). As an example, he
cited Congress’s power to provide a uniform rule of naturalization. Id. With respect to foreign
affairs, the Constitution never demands a uniform approach across the United States.
166. The Declaration of Independence para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
167. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. VI.
168. Id. art. II.
169. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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More importantly, the qualified prohibitions in Clause 3 implicitly
countenance a continued state role. Without congressional consent, states
cannot lay tonnage duties or enter into international agreements or com-
pacts.170 Only in time of war or with congressional consent may the states
raise troops and keep warships.171 Similarly, states are barred from engaging
in war unless invaded or in imminent danger of invasion.172 Because Clause
3 never grants powers, it presupposes that states have preexisting foreign
affairs powers that remain intact where the Constitution does not abridge
them. Absent such antecedent state power, congressional consent would be
meaningless.
To underscore our point, one should note that, in certain respects, the
Constitution affords the states greater leeway in foreign affairs than the Arti-
cles, for it lacks some of its predecessor’s constraints. The latter forbade
states from sending or receiving ambassadors without the consent of Con-
gress.173 The Constitution never purports to constrain a state’s ability to
send or receive emissaries. Similarly, the Articles barred state officers from
receiving “present[s], emolument[s], office[s] or title[s] . . . from any king,
prince or foreign state.”174 Again, the Constitution never restrains state of-
ficers in this way.175
Relatedly, the Constitution’s proscriptions on state action in foreign af-
fairs were clearly not comprehensive, even with regard to activities states
were engaged in at the time of ratification. For instance, some states discrim-
inated against foreign nationals,176 even though such treatment could “pro-
voke international incidents.”177 Some states also passed selective purchasing
laws geared at rewarding—or punishing—the conduct of particular na-
tions.178 One might also suppose that the states retained the right to impose
embargos, a power that they had exercised repeatedly during the War of
170. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. VI.
174. Id.
175. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
176. For an example of such legislation, see 11 The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania
from 1682 to 1801, at 542–45 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders comps., 1906), which
conferred generous judicial rights upon subjects of “his most Christian Majesty”—a reference
to the King of France. Because this law favored French nationals, it essentially discriminated
against all other nationals.
177. Ramsey, supra note 14, at 398 n.178.
178. See, e.g., An Act Providing Arms and Ammunition for the Defence of the State, re-
printed in 1 The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of the Laws of Virginia, from
the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619, at 494 (William Waller Hening
ed., 1823) (“[I]f any . . . arms and accoutrements shall be imported from Europe, such impor-
tation shall be from France.”). For a discussion of this law and others like it, see Ramsey, supra
note 14, at 390 n.181.
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Independence.179 Although some Framers sought to strip states of this
power, delegates rejected this proposal.180
These historical examples hardly exhaust the possibilities. By receiving
an ambassador to negotiate an international compact, a state might recog-
nize a new nation, despite the fact that the federal government had not rec-
ognized it.181 Although the United States did not recognize Haitian
independence until 1862,182 a state might have done so a half century before.
In another move replete with foreign implications, states might have estab-
lished special immigration procedures for certain favored nationals during
the century in which the federal government left immigration wholly to the
states.183 Imagine, for example, the foreign complications of a state choosing
to disfavor British immigration during the French Republic’s war against
Europe in the late 18th century.
Given the Constitution’s text, structure, and context, we wholeheartedly
agree with Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith that “all foreign relations
powers not denied to the states by Article I, Section 10 fall within the con-
current authority of the state and federal governments.”184 The Constitution
does not render the states mute and deaf on the international stage. Nor
does it ensure that the United States stands united on that stage.
Stepping back for a moment and contemplating the bigger picture, it
seems fair to say that the Constitution implicitly divides state intervention in
foreign affairs into three categories. For certain acts, like making treaties and
granting letters of marque and reprisal, the Constitution erects an absolute
bar.185 Other times, for example, with keeping warships or troops in peace-
time or making international compacts, it enacts a qualified bar that Con-
gress can lift via legislation.186 Finally, with respect to foreign affairs powers
179. See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Imbecilic Executive, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1361,
1383 & n.112 (2013) (exploring this phenomenon).
180. 2 Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 17, at 440–41.
181. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085 (2015) (discussing how the power
to receive ambassadors is “tantamount to recognizing the sovereignty of the sending state”).
182. See Rayford W. Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with
Haiti, 1776-1891, at 298–303 (1941).
183. As Gerald Neuman has shown, the states regularly enacted regulation touching on
immigration in the century proceeding the Founding. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century
of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 98 Colum. L. Rev 1833, 1841–84 (1993) (compre-
hensively documenting the various forms of state legislation in this arena). For an example of
the states provoking consternation through their regulation of immigration, see Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). California required that a bond be paid for certain passengers
upon their entry into the state. One class of passengers for which this bond was required was
“lewd and debauched women.” Id. at 276. As the Court explained, it was “hardly possible to
conceive a statute more skillfully [sic] framed, to place in the hands of a single man the power
to prevent entirely vessels engaged in a foreign trade . . . with China, from carrying passengers,
or to compel them to submit to systematic extortion of the grossest kind.” Id. at 278.
184. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 165, at 2267.
185. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
October 2016] The Reconstruction of Foreign Affairs Federalism 79
not in these two categories, such as sending and receiving ambassadors, the
Constitution erects no impediment.187
B. The Constitution Does Not Safeguard the Retained
Foreign Relations Powers
Much of the scholarship about foreign affairs federalism emphasizes the
previous principle. Yet we think this idea of retained powers hardly exhausts
the principles derivable from the Constitution’s foreign affairs federalism.
Indeed, excessive focus on the first principle leads to a distorted sense of the
actual contours of the Constitution.
We believe that there is a second principle of foreign affairs federalism.
While the Constitution assumes that states may continue to dabble in for-
eign affairs, it never actually guarantees them such a role. In particular, it
never declares or implies that the states have a constitutional right to adopt
and pursue their own foreign policies.
Our argument for this proposition is simple. The Constitution rarely
specifies the authorities states have,188 preferring to specify what states may
not do.189 Occasionally the Constitution makes clear that it guarantees a
right to the states, as when it “reserve[es]” to the states the rights to appoint
militia officers and to implement congressional training rules.190 And infre-
quently, the Constitution promises the states something, as when it assures
them a “Republican Form of Government” and protection against invasions
and rebellions.191
The conspicuous failure to reserve the states a particular role in foreign
affairs or guarantee them any set of constitutional powers in foreign affairs
signals that the Constitution itself does not cede states a “constitutional
right” to engage in foreign affairs. There is no provision “reserving” to the
states the power to send ambassadors or “guaranteeing” them the right to
denounce fascist or communist countries. Likewise, there is no clause speci-
fying that states have a constitutional right to regulate foreign commerce or
the rights of aliens. And, of course, American states lack a constitutional
right to adopt laws that favor particular foreign regimes (say England) and
disfavor others (say Iran).
We would go so far as to say that the states do not even have a constitu-
tional right to defend themselves from attack, at least in the sense of an
indefeasible right not subject to congressional regulation. For instance, if
states repeatedly and wrongfully invoked the provision that permits them to
187. See supra notes 174–181 and accompanying text.
188. For an exception to this general principle, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be pre-
scribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”).
189. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 10; id. amend. XIV.
190. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. We are inclined to read this provision as indicating that the
Constitution establishes that only states can appoint militia officers and implement congres-
sional training rules.
191. Id. art. IV, § 4.
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wage war when in “imminent Danger [of an invasion] as will not admit of
delay”,192 we believe that Congress may impose a prophylactic rule barring
resort to that authority. Imagine if Texas, in a thinly veiled grab for territory,
repeatedly invaded Mexico over the course of years, each time claiming that
Mexico was contemplating an imminent incursion into Texas. Or imagine
that in the wake of a Canadian invasion, Minnesota insisted on fielding its
own army, consistent with its retained right to “keep Troops” in the after-
math of an invasion,193 but repeatedly deployed that army in ways that ham-
pered the federal government’s military efforts against Canada. In the latter
case, we believe that Congress might step in and preempt Minnesota’s ac-
tion, because under our reading of the Constitution states lack an absolute
right to conduct their own defense. Instead, their right to defend themselves
is a default right that may be modified or abridged by federal statute.
Some may suppose that the Tenth Amendment indicates that states have
a constitutional right to exercise all powers that they retain. But that is surely
mistaken. That amendment only provides that the powers “not delegated to
the United States . . . are reserved to the States . . . or the people.”194 If we are
right that the federal government has constitutional power to bar interfer-
ence with its conduct of foreign affairs,195 the amendment is inapplicable.
After all, if we are right, there would be power delegated to the United States
to preempt the states in foreign affairs and hence no foreign affairs authority
could be reserved (guaranteed) to the states or the people. The amendment’s
purpose, to guard against the “national government . . . exercis[ing] powers
not granted,”196 is simply not implicated by our claim.
In sum, while the Constitution permits the states to retain a role in
foreign affairs (the first principle), it never provides—explicitly or implic-
itly—that states have a constitutional entitlement to engage in foreign affairs
(the second principle). Hence, even if the Constitution protects “states’
rights,” the latter does not encompass an unconditional right to advance
state foreign policies.
C. Congressional Power to Preempt in Foreign Affairs
Even if the Constitution never safeguards state authority in the interna-
tional arena, it does not follow that Congress cannot bar the states from
pursuing their own foreign policies. This is where the third feature of for-
eign affairs federalism enters the analysis. The third principle, one crucial to
our policy suggestions at the end of this Article, is that Congress enjoys
legislative power to bar the states from the foreign arena.
192. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
193. Id.
194. Id. amend. X.
195. See infra Section III.C.
196. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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In speaking about power to preempt in foreign affairs, the Supreme
Court has said “[a] fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Con-
gress has the power to preempt state law.”197 Though true with respect to
foreign affairs, the Court never specified the basis for this power. Similarly,
scholars have claimed that Congress can preempt when states interfere with
federal foreign policy, without generally indicating the sources of such
authority.198
The power to preempt state law cannot come from the Supremacy
Clause. The Clause does not grant power to preempt state law. Instead, it
merely provides a rule of decision favoring federal law when it conflicts with
state law, a directive that is premised on a valid exercise of federal author-
ity.199 If a federal enactment (law or treaty) is invalid (unconstitutional),
there can be no preemption of state law by virtue of that enactment. Put
another way, though the Supremacy Clause declares that federal statutes and
treaties are supreme, the Court has never held that all federal statutes and
treaties prevail over contrary state law, for doing so would render unconsti-
tutional federal enactments supreme over state law, something the Constitu-
tion never declares. In its earliest cases, the Court decided not only whether
there was a conflict between federal and state law, it also judged whether the
federal law was constitutional, an irrelevant inquiry if all federal laws, consti-
tutional or not, preempted state law.200
The statutory power to preempt state law, when it exists, arises from the
substantive powers of Congress, found in Article I and elsewhere. The statu-
tory power to preempt in foreign affairs arises from congressional power
over foreign commerce, the law of nations, and the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
Consider the Foreign Commerce Clause201 and its broad grant of au-
thority, a power that the Court has sometimes described as “plenary.”202
Under that Clause, we are certain that Congress could declare that the im-
portation of a good from a foreign country “shall be legal and permitted.”
Necessarily, this statute would supplant any state statutes that bar that
good’s importation. Going further, Congress could impose a tariff on the
importation of a foreign good and append a provision that preempts all
state regulation of that good’s importation. This would be a regulation cou-
pled with a federal occupation of the foreign commerce field with respect to
197. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
198. See Ramsey, supra note 14, at 398 n.211 (noting common assumption that federal
government can preempt the states in foreign affairs). Ramsey briefly attempts to make the
case for federal authority by citing Congress’s need to legislate in support of the president’s
authority. Id.
199. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 750–51 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190, 200–01 (1824) (affirming
federal commerce power over navigation before concluding that federal statute preempted
state law).
201. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
202. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492–93 (1904) (describing power of Congress
over foreign commerce as “plenary”).
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the good. Going further still, using its extensive commerce authority, Con-
gress may choose to enact no substantive rules with respect to foreign com-
merce but may decide, via statute, that no state shall enact any regulation of
foreign commerce. This would be “a naked preemption” statute,203 albeit one
that established laissez-faire as the method of federal “regulation” of foreign
commerce. Our point is that the Clause includes extensive authority to pre-
empt state regulation of foreign, interstate, and Indian commerce, whether
or not Congress enacts affirmative regulations of those streams. In other
words, Congress can “regulate” foreign commerce by barring state regula-
tion of it.
The same sorts of analyses apply to the power to define and punish
violations of the law of nations. For instance, states might authorize their
officials to arrest and detain foreign ambassadors, something contrary to the
law of nations. But Congress may preempt such state laws using its “define
and punish” authority.204 Congress could criminalize trespasses against for-
eign ambassadors, even those conducted under the color of state law. Such a
law would implicitly preempt any state law that permitted state officials to
accost foreign ambassadors. Similarly, states might authorize the detention
of private parties who have federal “safe conducts,”205 thereby violating in-
ternational law. In response, Congress may enact federal law that seeks to
punish (and therefore deter) such state detention.206 Again, such a statute
would implicitly preempt the state detention law. In sum, using its define
and punish power, Congress has some authority to preempt state laws that
conflict with the law of nations.
Constitutional power to preempt state interference in foreign affairs also
derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.207 As Chief Justice John Rob-
erts recently explained, the Clause does not grant Congress unlimited legis-
lative authority.208 But we think the Clause clearly vests Congress with power
to preempt state involvement in foreign affairs. In particular, when Congress
203. Although the concept of naked preemption remains relatively unexplored, some
scholars have before used the term in different settings. See David A. Gerber, On Nimmer on
Copyright, 26 UCLA L. Rev. 925, 927, 935–37 (1979) (book review) (discussing the concept of
naked preemption).
204. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Judicial interpretations of the Define and Punish
Clause are notoriously few in number, but for useful background see Peter Margulies, Justice at
War: Military Tribunals and Article III, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 305, 352–56 (2015). For a
broader explication of the clause, see Sarah H. Cleveland & William S. Dodge, Defining and
Punishing Offenses Under Treaties, 124 Yale L.J. 2202 (2015).
205. Safe conducts were permits to receive protection while in a foreign country and were
issued to foreigners. For a general discussion, see Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of
the Alien Tort Statute, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 830, 836–37 (2006) (discussing the First Congress’s
three conceptions of safe conducts).
206. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 28, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (criminalizing violations of
safe conducts granted to ambassadors).
207. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
208. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) [hereinafter
NFIB] (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“Although the Clause gives Congress authority to ‘legislate
on that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution,’ it does not
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concludes that such interventions make it more difficult for the efficacious
exercise of federal foreign affairs authority by the Congress or the president,
Congress may preempt the states on the grounds that such supersession is
necessary and proper.
In order to be necessary, a law must be “ ‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘con-
ducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’ ”209 A law’s consistency “with
the letter and spirit of the constitution”210 conduces to its propriety. Hence
Congress may not use the Necessary and Proper Clause to do what the Con-
stitution elsewhere prohibits, nor usurp powers not granted to it.211 Moreo-
ver, the law in question must “carry into execution” a power of the federal
government.212 As one Federalist summed it up at the Founding, where Con-
gress passes a law “in consequence of this clause, [it] must pursue some of
the delegated powers, but can by no means depart from them, or arrogate
any new powers.”213
In the abstract, the usefulness of preempting state involvement in for-
eign affairs should be evident. As Part I discussed, state laws in this arena
can interfere with the proper exercise of federal authority. To ensure that the
nation is united, that it is “made one as to all foreign . . . matters,”214 it may
be necessary to suppress counterproductive state overtones so that the fed-
eral voice can be heard without distortion or distraction. We believe that the
deleterious effects of foreign affairs freelancing make for one of the strongest
cases for preemption of state law.215
license the exercise of any ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’ beyond those specifi-
cally enumerated.”) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411, 421
(1819)).
209. Id. at 2592 (quoting United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133–34 (2010)); see
also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 316 (1819) (explaining that Congress
may pass laws “essential to the beneficial exercise of [its] power” even where they are not
“indispensably necessary,” and that “right[s] incidental . . . and conducive” to the exercise of
the enumerated powers are similarly appropriate); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke
L.J. 267, 288 (1993) (“[U]se of the phrase ‘absolutely necessary’ in Article I, Section 10, Clause
2 strongly suggests that ‘necessary,’ by itself [in the Necessary and Proper Clause], does not
connote indispensability.”).
210. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (echoing this standard).
211. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see also Lawson & Granger,
supra note 209, at 297 (“[T]he word ‘proper’ was often used during the founding era to de-
scribe the powers of a governmental entity as peculiarly within the province or jurisdiction of
that entity.”).
212. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 324.
213. 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia
in 1787, at 441 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1937) (1836).
214. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph Jones, supra note 13, at 34.
215. To the extent one insists on a higher standard for legislation enacted under the
Clause, we do not doubt that our proposal satisfies it. For an argument that “necessary” means
something more than “useful,” see Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 183, 184 (2003) (stating that “the truth lies some-
where in between” the standards of “indispensably requisite” and “merely ‘convenient’ ”).
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Little further need be said about why preemption might be useful or
convenient for carrying congressional foreign affairs powers into execution.
For instance, Congress may more efficaciously provide for the nation’s de-
fense216 when states are not pursuing their own foreign policies, provoking
nations that are at peace with the United States. Relatedly, if reliance upon
the Necessary and Proper Clause is necessary to block state regulation of
foreign commerce (meaning that exercises of Commerce Clause authority
are insufficient for such preemption), Congress may preempt on the belief
that preemption furthers its foreign commerce policies.
Likewise, preempting state interference with the president’s foreign af-
fairs powers217 is no less useful. Preemption of state intrusions serves to
make the president’s exercise of foreign affairs authority more effective. For
instance, the executive may be able to more effectually extract concessions
from foreign nations in treaty negotiations if individual states are not at-
tempting to strike separate agreements or compacts with foreign govern-
ments. The general point is that executive can more effectively speak for the
country on the international stage when the states are not in the foreground
singing discordant tunes.
As for the Clause’s “proper” prong, we believe that federal statutes that
preempt state intrusions in foreign affairs are proper because such federal
laws are consistent with the Constitution’s letter and spirit. Again, while the
Constitution never ousts the states from foreign affairs, we believe it never
guarantees them a role either. The absence of such reserved state enclaves in
foreign affairs makes it impossible to conclude that federal preemptive stat-
utes are improper.
As our discussion of the Commerce Clause suggested, the sweep and
manner of federal preemption in foreign affairs under the Necessary and
Proper Clause can vary dramatically. Again, Congress may choose to regu-
late and preempt narrowly, for example, it may regulate a discrete area by
establishing certain rules and preempting state regulation of that zone. For
instance, Congress could enact foreign extradition rules for the states and
provide that the states may not negotiate foreign compacts in contravention
of those rules. Such a statute would help carry into execution Congress’s
authority over the making of state compacts with foreign nations by setting
limits on permissible compacts.
Moreover, as with the case of the Commerce Clause, Congress may em-
ploy the Necessary and Proper Clause to nakedly preempt the states. For
instance, Congress could provide that no state shall separately negotiate any
compact with foreign nations related to trade, leaving the federal govern-
ment with a monopoly on striking such agreements. In this case, Congress
would have decided that the president or Congress ought to craft trade
agreements on behalf of the entire nation and that individual states should
not even attempt to strike such an accord.
216. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
217. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 47, at 265–75.
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Relatedly, Congress’s naked preemption statutes enacted under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause need not be narrowly drawn. In fact, we believe
that the Constitution permits Congress to enact a statute that flatly prohibits
all state involvement in foreign affairs. While such a statute would be some-
what vague, it would not be unconstitutional, for it would be designed to
carry federal foreign affairs authorities into execution.
Although we have focused on preemption, we believe that Congress may
do more than preempt state law under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
After all, preemption does not wholly eliminate the state impetus to engage
in foreign affairs as much as it seeks to nullify the effects of those state
interventions. One can imagine state legislators attempting to legislate on
matters barred to them by federal statute when those politicians believe that
the mere attempt to legislate, whether successful or not, will garner them
donations or votes. If members of Congress believe that states should be
more comprehensively deterred from entering the foreign arena, they may
craft rules designed to induce state officials to avoid the field altogether.
Subject to normal rules applicable to all criminal laws, like the rule of lenity,
etcetera., Congress may conclude that criminalizing interference with federal
foreign affairs prerogatives is useful and suitable as a means of implementing
those authorities.
Lest we be mistaken, ours is a claim about the sweeping scope of federal
authority over foreign affairs. We believe that the federal government likely
cannot completely oust the states from certain domestic spheres. For in-
stance, the federal government likely cannot wholly divest the states of their
ability to tax property because such a federal statute would be inconsistent
with the Constitution’s spirit and therefore improper. While Congress may
lay various taxes, it must not constrain state taxation to the point that it
cripples the independence or existence of the states.
Our limited point here is that foreign affairs is not an area where the
states enjoy an unassailable enclave of guaranteed authority. There is no
warrant for treating foreign affairs like taxes. While money is the mother’s
milk of politics, and therefore a vital resource for state governments, no one
can imagine that foreign affairs rests at the heart of state sovereignty.
1. Historical and Doctrinal Support for this Power
We believe that constitutional text sufficiently establishes that Congress
may deter and preempt state interventions in foreign affairs. But we also
draw support from long-established federal statutes and judicial doctrines.
Enduring federal laws bespeak extensive congressional power to bar interfer-
ence with federal stewardship of foreign affairs.218 And the Supreme Court
has endorsed the proposition that Congress may oust the states from broad
spheres, even in the absence of comprehensive federal legislation.219 These
218. See infra notes 220 and 223 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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legislative enactments and judicial declarations should leave little doubt that
Congress enjoys authority to oust the states from foreign affairs.
Examples of Congresses barring interference in international matters
date back to the Federalist era.  For instance, the Crimes Act of 1790 out-
lawed attempts to imprison foreign public ministers or seize or attach their
assets and also criminalized attempts to seek, prosecute, or enforce judicial
decrees related to the same.220 The Act explicitly applied to “officers” who
might enforce such decrees.221 Moreover, the Act criminalized violations of
safe conducts and “offering violence” to foreign public ministers.222 These
prohibitions evidently applied to state officials.
Or consider the 1794 Neutrality Act.223 At the time, Americans were
taking up arms and siding with France in its war against Great Britain.224
Given the capacity of nonfederal actors to draw the country into war, “[i]t
would be most deplorable if no such controlling power existed in” the fed-
eral government to prevent such actions.225 Of course, Congress had such
authority. The Act not only barred attacks on nations with which the United
States was at peace, it also barred certain forms of assistance to foreign war-
ships.226 Again, the Act applied to all persons, including state officials.227
The 1799 Logan Act bars any citizen (including state officials) from “in-
fluenc[ing] the measures or conduct of . . . foreign government[s] . . . in
relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States.”228 Congress
found the law necessary because such attempts at private diplomacy were a
“usurpation of executive authority.”229 The Act’s application to state officials
is apparent not only from its text, but from its history as well; the Act was a
response to the foreign affairs freelancing of a state legislator, George
Logan.230
220. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 25–26, 1 Stat. 112, 117–18.
221. Id. § 26.
222. Id. § 28.
223. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381.
224. Application of the Neutrality Act to Official Gov’t Activities, 8 Op. O.L.C. 58, 59–62
(1984).
225. United States v. O’Sullivan, 27 F. Cas. 367, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 15,975).
226. §§ 3–5, 1 Stat. at 383–84.
227. See An Act of June 5, 1794, 1 Stat. 381. Some may say that these prohibitions did no
more than duplicate the Constitution’s own prohibitions. That requires an aggressive interpre-
tation of the Constitution’s proscriptions. Article I, Section 10 prohibits the states from engag-
ing in war. But the 1794 Neutrality Act barred far more. For instance, the bill forbade the
outfitting of foreign ships where those vessels were to be used by “any foreign prince or state to
cruise or commit hostilities upon the subjects” of other states, even those whom the United
States was not allied with. Id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 383. Also forbidden was “adding to the number or
size of the guns of such vessel[s],” id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 383 a proscription that sounds more in
commercial regulation than a bar on making war.
228. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2012).
229. 9 Annals of Cong. 2488–89 (1789).
230. See id. at 2503–04; see also Kevin M. Kearney, Comment, Private Citizens in Foreign
Affairs: A Constitutional Analysis, 36 Emory L.J. 285, 292 (1987).
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While early acts of Congress support our theory of broad legislative
power to bar interference in foreign affairs, the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence is even more supportive. First, as was discussed in Part II, the Court
has eagerly read all manner of federal enactments—statutes, treaties, execu-
tive agreements—as if they preempted state law. In so doing, the Court has
shown a penchant for preemption of state interference. Though we question
its approach, we share this policy preference. For our purposes, the Court’s
enthusiasm for finding preemption signals that there is nothing amiss in
congressional preemption of state interference in foreign affairs. After all, it
would be odd for the Court to adopt broad readings of federal enactments if
doing so raised constitutional issues about Congress’s ability to preempt. We
think that the Court embraced expansive readings of federal statutes because
it saw absolutely no difficulties with federal preemption in this arena. What
Justice Souter said in Crosby—that “[a] fundamental principle of the Consti-
tution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law,”231 is undoubt-
edly true with respect to foreign affairs.
Second, the Court has occasionally discussed field preemption in a way
that supports broad federal power to preempt. For over a century the Court
has spoken of federal authority to oust the states from certain regulatory
spheres entirely. The Court most clearly recognized this power in a line of
cases at the beginning of the 20th century, beginning with Southern Railway
Co. v. Reid.232 Reid concerned the intersection of federal and state authority
over the burgeoning railroad industry.233 The Court invalidated a South Car-
olina act regulating railroad companies, finding that, by virtue of the Inter-
state Commerce Act, Congress had “taken possession of the field” of railroad
regulation.234
Given the Court’s reading of a federal statute to implicitly oust the states
from the entire sphere of railroad regulation, it is clear that the Court sup-
posed Congress could occupy that sphere, even in the absence of federal
legislation that sought to regulate every aspect of railroads. The Reid court
spoke of a “[f]ederal exertion of authority which takes from a State the
power to regulate,” unqualified by any need for a conflict between state and
federal law.235 In other words, the Court did not conclude that specific pro-
visions of federal and state law were incompatible. Instead the Court found
that Congress had completely stripped the states of their authority to regu-
late in this arena.
The Court spoke more clearly three years later in Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railway Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co.236 The case concerned
231. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).
232. 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
233. For a thorough examination of Reid and its progeny, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The
Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 767, 803–06 (1994).
234. Reid, 222 U.S. at 442.
235. See id. at 435–37, 442.
236. 226 U.S. 426 (1913).
88 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:47
the regulation of railroad car delivery, a subject over which the Court as-
sumed the states were permitted to regulate “in the absence of [controlling]
legislation by Congress.”237 The Court construed an act of Congress to com-
pletely strip the states of their authority. Specifically, “the power of the State
over the subject-matter ceased to exist,” when Congress dealt with a subject
over which the states had “no inherent, but only permissive, power.”238 In a
case decided later that year, the Court explained that this jurisdiction strip-
ping of the states could extend to cases where their acts purport to supple-
ment, rather than conflict, with the relevant federal law.239
To be sure, the Court no longer preempts state action in a given arena
unless Congress manifests such an intent.240 We have no quarrel with this
focus on intent as a touchstone for preemption. Our only point is that it
should be clear that the Supreme Court supposes that Congress may strip
the states of authority in certain arenas of concurrent jurisdiction. More
precisely, the Court believes that where the Constitution does not guarantee
the states certain powers, Congress may strip the states of their concurrent
authority when the latter concludes that state involvement interferes with
the exercise of federal authority.
We agree with what is implicit in the Court’s foreign affairs federalism
cases. Because the states lack a constitutional right to engage in foreign af-
fairs and because Congress enjoys authority to ensure the implementation of
federal foreign affairs powers, Congress may enact measures meant to pre-
vent state interference with federal stewardship of foreign affairs.
2. Considering Counterarguments
Because our constitutional claims are novel, we are hard-pressed to
identify the objections one might lodge. Nonetheless, we see four possible
concerns: (1) the Founders rejected the idea of a congressional negative on
state laws; (2) Congress does not possess the power to tell the states they may
not exercise concurrent authority when the national legislature has not itself
yet acted in that arena—Congress cannot “nakedly preempt”; (3) the First
Amendment prevents Congress from stifling the voices of the states, even in
the foreign arena; (4) Congress cannot preempt the states in order to shield
237. See Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 226 U.S. at 435.
238. Id.
239. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604
(1915) (“When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand coincidence is as
ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go
farther than Congress has seen fit to go.”).
240. See Gardbaum, supra note 233, at 806. This change in approach was necessary in
order to retain state competence over its traditional areas of legislation in the face of growing
federal power. The absence of intent to preempt from Congress might have otherwise resulted
in the Court stripping the states of far more authority than was necessary to effectuate Con-
gress’s aims. See id.
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the president’s executive power where the president wishes no such de-
fense—that is, our claim raises substantial separation of powers concerns.
We take these issues up in turn.
At the Founding there was a move to grant federal authority to negative
state laws. The Virginia Plan provided that Congress could “negative all laws
passed by the several States contravening . . . the articles of union.”241
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina conceived of a power to negative all
state laws that Congress judged “improper.”242 Of course, the state delega-
tions never acted on such suggestions and the Constitution contains no ex-
press “power to negative” state acts, unconstitutional or otherwise.
The failure to enact such provisions is irrelevant to our claims, for we do
not argue that Congress, via the Necessary and Proper Clause or otherwise,
can preempt all unconstitutional or improper state laws. Instead, we believe
that the federal government has power that is both broader and narrower
than the ones discussed at Philadelphia. Federal power is broader because
Congress may enact laws that preempt state laws even in the absence of a
constitutional conflict; in other words, Congress can preempt state laws that
are entirely constitutional. Moreover, Congress need not wait for the states
to pass such laws. Rather than preempting particular state laws as and when
they arise, Congress can enact prophylactic rules. To take a real example,
Congress may provide that an executive agency must preclear state laws
before they become operative.243
In our view, federal power is narrower in that Congress cannot preempt
state law where it lacks subject matter authority over the relevant area. For
instance, even if Congress thought that state bans on gun possession within
1,000 feet of schools was improper, it likely could not preempt such state
bans because Congress lacks substantive authority over this behavior.244 Sim-
ilarly, Congress probably cannot preempt where the Constitution guarantees
states concurrent authority. For instance, Congress probably cannot provide
that the states may not erect quarantines.245 Our point is that Congress does
not have a roving commission to preempt all state laws that it regards as
improper, and our constitutional claims do not suggest otherwise.
In any event, notwithstanding the failure to enact a provision that
would have enabled Congress to nullify all unconstitutional state laws, abso-
lutely no one can gainsay that Congress can preempt at least some state laws.
The Supremacy Clause would have no reason to declare that federal statutes
241. 1 Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 17, at 61 (emphasis added); see
also id. at 21.
242. Id. at 164.
243. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (2012) (providing that no “voting qualification or prerequi-
site to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” shall be enacted
without preclearance from the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia).
244. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
245. See, e.g., People ex rel Barmore v. Robertson, 134 N.E. 815, 817 (Ill. 1922) (“The duty
to preserve the public health finds ample support in the police power, which is inherent in the
state, and which the state cannot surrender.”).
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supersede state law if it were constitutionally impermissible for Congress to
preempt state law.
The idea that Congress cannot impose field preemption absent some
affirmative federal regulation is also misguided. As argued earlier, the funda-
mental question is whether Congress has legislative power to preempt. If it
does, that should be the end of the discussion. Hence if the Commerce
Clause gives authority to preempt or if the Necessary and Proper Clause
conveys power to supersede, naked preemption statutes are entirely
constitutional.
Moreover, we are aware of no doctrinal authority requiring the creation
of a federal regulatory scheme in order for the national government to divest
the states of power in an arena. To the contrary, the most relevant case law
concerning this issue supports our view. The Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”) is a simple, one-page act that makes it
illegal for governmental entities to “sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, li-
cense, or authorize by law or compact” any form of gambling on sports
contests.246 In NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, the Third Circuit considered
PASPA’s constitutionality.247 Despite the fact that “PASPA provides no fed-
eral regulatory standards or requirements of its own,”248 the majority upheld
its constitutionality, citing the Commerce Clause.249 Judge Vanaskie dis-
sented, positing that “the Supremacy Clause simply does not give Congress
the power to tell the states what they can and cannot do in the absence of a
validly-enacted federal regulatory or deregulatory scheme.”250
We agree that the Supremacy Clause does not grant a power to preempt.
But, as we have explained, the substantive powers of Congress include au-
thority to preempt state law. As the Third Circuit majority put it, “the fed-
eral [commercial] policy with respect to sports gambling is that such activity
should not occur under the auspices of a state license.”251 Similarly, the pol-
icy of a foreign affairs preemption statute would be that the states should be
barred from certain aspects of foreign affairs. Because Congress has some
authority over foreign affairs and may help carry federal foreign affairs pow-
ers into execution, it may preempt state interference with the federal exercise
of those powers.
Even if our claims about the constitutionality of naked preemption stat-
utes are misbegotten, any federal law that preempts state foreign policies is
246. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012). The 1992 Act grandfathered all existing activities by govern-
mental entities, meaning that Nevada could continue to license and authorize gambling on
sports. See id. § 3704.
247. 730 F.3d 208 (3d. Cir. 2013).
248. NCAA, 730 F.3d at 247 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting); see also id. at 245 n.3 (“[T]here is
no federal regulatory or deregulatory scheme on the matter of sports wagering. Instead, there
is the congressional directive that states not allow it.”).
249. Id. at 224–25 (majority opinion).
250. Id. at 245 n.3 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 236 (majority opinion).
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best understood as preempting in a field where there already is much sub-
stantive federal regulation. After all, Congress legislates in many areas per-
taining to foreign affairs.252 Congress could judge that the range of state
statutes it chooses to preempt are inconsistent with the broad outlines of
existing federal statutes and treaties. As we argued earlier, the Supreme
Court’s willingness (approaching on avid eagerness) to infer something like
field preemption in foreign affairs stands as good reason to suppose that
express congressional authorization of field preemption must be constitu-
tional. Again, if the Court can infer that Congress meant to occupy some
parts of the foreign affairs field, it can hardly be illegitimate for Congress to
make clear its intentions to do so.
As noted, some argue that the First Amendment effectively limits the
restrictions the federal government may impose on the states. Under this
view, the Constitution accords state governments and actors the same First
Amendment protections as private actors.253 Because private parties cannot
be stripped of the right to speak on foreign affairs, the argument goes, the
states likewise have the right to express themselves on international matters.
We find this argument perplexing, and believe that the First Amend-
ment poses no obstacle to federal statutes that bar the states from opining
on foreign matters. Even if state governments stand in the same shoes as
private actors with respect to the First Amendment’s protections,254 the fed-
eral government’s interest in preempting state activity here is more compel-
ling than would be legislation aimed at limiting the speech of private actors.
States are capable of greater mischief because foreign nations are more likely
to conclude that the state officials speak with an official imprimatur, in con-
trast to the musings of private individuals. The Supreme Court has noted
that national observance of a treaty, protecting relations with foreign gov-
ernments, and demonstrating a commitment to international law are
252. Congress has legislated on an immense range of subjects touching on foreign affairs,
from multilateral treaty implementation to rendering nation-specific aid. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.
§ 3302 (2012) (providing that it is U.S. policy to “make available to Taiwan such defense
articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain
a sufficient self-defense capability”); id. § 6303 (barring the rendering of assistance in nuclear
matters to any “individual, group, or non-nuclear-weapon state”); id. §§ 6701–6771 (imple-
menting the Chemical Weapons Convention); id. § 7402 (prohibiting extradition of U.S. citi-
zens to countries that are under obligation to “surrender persons to the International Criminal
Court”).
253. See Andrea L. McArdle, In Defense of State and Local Government Anti-Apartheid
Measures: Infusing Democratic Values into Foreign Policymaking, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 813, 831
(1989); Porterfield, supra note 6, at 1–2.
254. To call this principle of law “unsettled” would be an understatement. The Supreme
Court has never addressed the subject of whether the First Amendment protects the states
from federal speech restrictions. For the “most recent summary of the issue,” see David
Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1637 (2006); see also
Eugene Volokh, Do State and Local Governments Have Free Speech Rights?, Wash. Post: The
Volokh Conspiracy (June 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-con-
spiracy/wp/2015/06/24/do-state-and-local-governments-have-free-speech-rights/ [https://
perma.cc/53CC-AVA2].
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“plainly compelling” interests.255 If so, maintaining friendly relations with
foreign nations likewise counts as a compelling interest in suppressing state
declamations against foreign governments.
Healthy skepticism of the Logan Act should not cloud the issue. While
we take no position on the Act’s constitutionality, others have registered
strong objections.256 Those doubts center on its vagueness, overbreadth, and
overall tension with the First Amendment.257 The Act “fails to properly in-
form citizens of the conduct that it proscribes”258 and it seemingly prohibits
some actions that the government’s national security interest cannot jus-
tify.259 Moreover, the Act’s proscriptions apply to all citizens and thus may
be too sweeping.260 But even if these claims have merit, Congress could
surely design a narrowly tailored and precise statute that only squelches the
states (and not private citizens).
Finally, some might raise an objection grounded in the separation of
powers. When Congress preempts in order to more efficaciously exercise its
own constitutional powers, there can be no separation of powers concern.
Yet when Congress preempts to help implement presidential powers, per-
haps it is surreptitiously “aggrandiz[ing] itself at the expense of the” execu-
tive.261 A statute that precludes all state foreign affairs activities will
doubtless bar some state interventions where the president (and not Con-
gress) has substantive authority. For instance, Congress might suppose that a
federal statute barring states from sending or receiving emissaries helps bet-
ter carry into execution the president’s foreign affairs powers because the
states will be less able to confound and combat the president’s foreign poli-
cies. But perhaps a particular president welcomes the exchange of such emis-
saries by the states. In this context, Congress’s approach clashes with the
president’s sense of the best means of conducting foreign policy and hence
might be thought to encroach upon the executive’s foreign policy
prerogatives.
This argument misunderstands the ambit of Congress’s Necessary and
Proper Clause authority. Congress has broad power to help implement pres-
idential power and may do so in ways that the president disapproves. For
255. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008).
256. See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 230; Detlev F. Vagts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or
Sleeping Giant?, 60 Am. J. Int’l L. 268 (1966).
257. Kearney, supra note 230, at 346–47. Kearney also asserts the Act’s invalidity on the
ground that while Congress may have extra authority to impinge upon constitutionally pro-
tected rights in the realm of national security, the Act is not narrowly tailored. Id. at 341; see
also Vagts, supra note 256, at 292–300.
258. Kearney, supra note 230, at 346.
259. See, e.g., Vagts, supra note 256, at 299 (explaining that were a group of Americans to
“cabl[e] their support of Khrushchev to the Kremlin during the Cuban missile crisis[,] [i]t
seems unlikely that a statute penalizing such action would be unconstitutional”; and yet, “the
Logan Act covers a great deal more than this and therein lie many problems”).
260. Logan Act, 1 Stat. 613 (1799) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1994)).
261. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 974 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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instance, the president may disapprove of a bill that splits one existing de-
partment into two on the grounds that it unnecessarily complicates the fed-
eral bureaucracy and makes it harder for him to faithfully execute the laws.
Nonetheless, Congress may override his policy objections, and, if necessary,
his veto as well. Just as the president has no power to preserve the status quo
with respect to departments, he likewise has no constitutional right to insist
that states retain their power to intervene in foreign affairs. Stripping the
states of power the president wishes them to retain may upset the president,
but it is not unconstitutional.
Moreover, as Part IV makes clear, we envision mechanisms through
which Congress might grant the executive the final say on most matters of
state interference. To the extent that preemption of the states in foreign af-
fairs raises separation of powers concerns, we conclude that the mechanisms
set out in Part IV substantially obviate them.
IV. A Superior Preemption Regime
As Part II noted, the courts currently act as the principal checks on a
state dabbling in foreign affairs. But a better system is available, one that
would curb the interventions of amateurish states and that could greatly
reduce the need for the courts to act as the frontline defenders of federal
authority. Congress can play a more active role, declaring when state inter-
ventions are impermissible. Additionally, Congress can delegate to the exec-
utive the power to determine when to preempt or bar state interventions.
We see at least two approaches that Congress may take to preempt state
action, even where that action does not conflict with existing federal law.
Congress may pursue a reactive course. Where mischievous state laws come
to its attention, Congress has the power to invalidate them on a case-by-case
basis. Though proper, this mechanism is less than ideal. Congress lacks the
time and attention to respond to every state intrusion into the foreign arena.
Fortunately, we see another way in which Congress may preempt. Con-
gress may enact a far-reaching preemption regime, one that bars trouble-
some state laws, both those currently on the books and those that will spring
up in the future. Proceeding in two sections, this Part considers how Con-
gress might accomplish this feat.
Section A discusses the mechanisms that Congress may deploy to pre-
empt state actions. Those mechanisms include: (i) judicial enforcement of a
flat ban on various types of legislation; (ii) a preclearance regime whereby
the State Department must review state legislation before it can take effect;
(iii) a suspensive veto allowing the State Department to preempt a state law
for a limited period, thereby giving Congress time to judge whether a more
enduring preemption is appropriate, and (iv) civil or criminal sanctions for
recalcitrant state actors. The overarching goal is to create a fairly compre-
hensive structure that expressly preempts state activity (mechanism (i)), al-
lows an informed and expert federal actor (the State Department or
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Congress) to quickly react to any state laws impacting foreign affairs (mech-
anisms (ii) and (iii)), and deters obstinate state officials from subverting this
federal scheme (mechanism (iv)).
Section B discusses triggers for each mechanism. We envision the fol-
lowing triggers: (i) state laws that discriminate based on foreign sovereign;
(ii) state laws that discriminate based on the content of foreign laws; (iii)
state laws that discriminate based on activities that occur in a foreign nation;
(iv) a catchall for any state law that may, broadly speaking, create friction
with the federal government’s conduct of foreign affairs; and (v) speech and
conduct by state officials on matters of international concern.
This Part also suggests how our triggers might be paired with mecha-
nisms. To illustrate, Congress could provide by statute that state laws dis-
criminating against foreign sovereigns (trigger 1) would face automatic
preemption (mechanism 1). For instance, suppose some states have selective
purchasing laws that specifically preclude state agencies from doing business
with companies doing business in Iran. By virtue of the statutory references
to Iran in these state laws, Congress’s statute would preempt such state laws.
Alternatively, if Congress wished to permit some state discrimination, it
could subject such laws to a State Department temporary suspensive veto
(mechanism 3).
Before proceeding further, we note some conceptual and practical
problems with a federal statutory solution. The problems pertain to defini-
tion and enforcement. Definition, in outlining the sphere within which the
states are preempted, and enforcement, in determining how to ensure that
the states remain outside that sphere. Consider, for instance, a federal law
that does no more than prohibit the states from “interfering in foreign af-
fairs” and leaves enforcement to the courts. The resulting system would, in
practice, be no different than the current regime, save for perhaps more
judicial invalidation of state law. Without defining “interfering in foreign
affairs,” Congress would leave the courts with as much latitude as they cur-
rently exercise. The enforcement method—ex post litigation—also would
not change the status quo.262
The courts already have enough trouble with preemption in foreign af-
fairs. A broad statutory directive that the courts police state interference in
this arena barely moves the goalposts, as opposed to working any conceptual
change. It continues the haphazard and unsatisfying judicial preemption
that motivated our solution in the first place.
Our proposed framework largely neutralizes these concerns. It moves
most decisions out of the judiciary and into the executive or Congress,
thereby increasing the likelihood of knowledgeable and sophisticated ap-
proaches to state involvement. While we retain a role for the courts, it is a
262. While the statute would legitimize judicial invalidations of state law because they
would no longer need to resort to dubious doctrines, our point is that the courts would still be
left guessing what kind of state conduct qualifies as “too much” interference with foreign
affairs.
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circumscribed one. Congress will provide the courts greater guidance and
confine them to circumstances that suit their capabilities.
A. Federal Preemptive Mechanisms
1. Judicial Preemption Based on Congressional Statutory Bans
Our first mechanism consists of judicial enforcement of federal statutes
barring state laws. Section B outlines the broad contours of the triggers that
might generate bars on state law. But, for the sake of illustration, consider
the following: Congress might decide that the states should be voiceless with
regard to national policy on Iran. To effectuate this desire, it might bar all
state laws that discriminate against Iran, its citizens, and firms conducting
business with the theocratic nation. Or consider more innocuous activities:
seeking to reduce barriers to foreign trade, Congress might prohibit states
from regulating the sale of foreign goods sold within the states.263
As compared to the status quo, the courts would have a statute to refer
to, one that provides a definition of the activity states may not engage in
(triggers), and also one that provides a remedy (invalidation). The courts
will no longer need to rely on aggressive readings of the Constitution
(Zschernig), federal statutes (Crosby), or executive agreements (Garamendi)
in order to preempt apparently inappropriate state laws.
In keeping with our theory of a limited judicial role, we believe that
absolute bans are best aimed at state laws that are easily identifiable. Ideally,
the courts should be able to determine rather quickly whether a given state
law runs afoul of the statute’s command. Were this mechanism attached to a
vague trigger, that is, where it was unclear which state laws the mechanism
prohibits, it would essentially leave the courts in their current role, a role we
believe to be undesirable.
Accordingly, Congress ought to carefully draw well-defined triggers for
absolute bans. This will put the states on notice about what is preempted
and will limit the reach of provisions that invalidate both existing and future
state laws. We provide some examples of state laws that might fall under this
mechanism in Sections B.1 and B.2 of this Part.
Further, because this mechanism prescribes harsh medicine, it should
attach to laws that, in the view of Congress, most clearly intrude into the
foreign arena. Categories of laws that only infrequently touch upon foreign
affairs are better policed through review by the political branches rather than
a complete prohibition.
263. Article I, Section 10 would seem to only restrict state power to impose an excise tax
on imports but not prohibit states from imposing other regulations on imported goods. U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts
or Duties on Imports or Exports . . . .”). For a discussion of the Import-Export Clause, see
Boris I. Bittker & Brannon P. Denning, The Import-Export Clause, 68 Miss. L.J. 521, 524
(1998) (“To be sure, the Import-Export Clause restricts only the taxing powers of the states,
not their regulatory authority . . . .”).
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Although this mechanism may seem unforgiving, Congress could
choose to create exceptions to its flat bans. Congress might declare that the
states are barred from singling out specific sovereigns for trade restrictions.
But, at a later date, Congress could permit the states to sanction a particular
government. For instance, with respect to North Korea, the national govern-
ment might initially act to safeguard its voice but later conclude that multi-
ple state voices are acceptable.
2. State Department Preclearance
Where flat bans are undesirable, Congress might choose to borrow from
the Voting Rights Act,264 by creating a preclearance regime and vesting au-
thority with the State Department. This effectively gives the president (as
constitutional superintendent of the State Department) an absolute veto
over new state laws that trigger this mechanism, subject to a judicial check to
determine whether the executive has exceeded its preclearance authority.265
A judicial determination of whether the executive has overstepped its dele-
gated authority is far preferable to the judiciary deciding whether to pre-
empt in the first instance.
Congress could apply this mechanism to state laws that presumptively
hinder the federal government’s ability to conduct foreign affairs. It may
suppose that a certain set of state laws pose a high likelihood of interfering
with the federal government’s conduct of foreign affairs and grant the State
Department authority to make the ultimate determination. Consider the
line of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases dealing with state taxation
of foreign assets in the United States. Congress might conclude that the
states presumptively intrude on federal prerogatives when they regulate in
this sphere. But perhaps Congress does not wish to strip them of all such
power to do so. The final determination about preemption might rest on
complex foreign policy considerations and rely upon classified information.
While the judiciary is ill-equipped to perform this task, the State Depart-
ment is better suited to it.
264. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971–1974 (2012). The statute’s preclearance provision provides that
certain jurisdictions may not enact changes with respect to voting unless those changes are
approved by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or where the juris-
diction submits its change to the Attorney General and the Attorney General does not “ob-
ject[ ] within sixty days after such submission.” Id. § 1973c(a). Importantly, the Supreme
Court did not invalidate this provision in its landmark decision on the Act in 2013. See Shelby
Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). Nor did it say that preclearance itself was always
unconstitutional. See id. Rather, the Shelby County Court found that the formula used to
determine the jurisdictions subject to this preclearance regime was unconstitutional under
principles of “equal sovereignty.” Id. at 2623–24, 2631.  We think a preclearance regime that
applies to all states is less susceptible to the charge that it violates the equal sovereignty of the
states.
265. We think it makes sense to vest authority with the State Department because the
president would be freed from having to make all decisions. Rather, the State Department
could make decisions, subject to occasional presidential intervention and override. For partic-
ularly sensitive preclearance decisions, Congress might sensibly suppose that the president
should be the decider.
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A few comments on this mechanism’s features are in order. First, we
again believe that Congress should carefully define the category of laws sub-
ject to preclearance so as to put state actors on notice. Second, unlike the
absolute ban, this mechanism does not affect state laws already on the books.
The State Department cannot preclear state laws that exist at the time it
receives a congressional grant of authority.
3. State Department Suspensive Veto Coupled with
Congressional Review
As a final mechanism, Congress might utilize a suspensive veto whereby
the State Department could suspend the operation of existing and new state
laws for a period of time. We believe this mechanism is most appropriate for
state laws whose effect on international affairs is rather uncertain. It allows
the states to legislate without automatic preemption (mechanism one) and
without State Department preapproval (mechanism two).
Further, Congress might authorize the State Department to suspend
state laws on an as applied basis. For an example of this application, recall
Zschernig and Oregon’s statute for alien inheritance predicated on reciprocal
rights in the alien’s home nation.266 If the State Department had the power
to suspend state laws as applied to particular countries, it could have decided
that the Oregon law inappropriately interfered with our nation’s policy to-
wards the Eastern Bloc. But it could have deemed such state laws perfectly
acceptable with regard to other regions of the world, say Central America.267
To limit this delegation, Congress might make the veto effective only for
a number of months—six perhaps—before the suspension expires and the
state law becomes operational again. This window is designed to give the
State Department adequate time to brief Congress on the issues the state law
presents and for Congress to take action. If Congress stays its hand, one
might assume that Congress did not regard the law’s intrusion into the for-
eign arena as sufficiently troublesome so as to overcome legislative inertia. A
positive byproduct of this approach is the effect it may have on later litiga-
tion. Should a state law face a challenge under a Zschernig or Garamendi
theory (assuming those doctrines are not jettisoned), a court might give
weight to Congress’s failure to extend the temporary preemption. Rather
than blindly assessing foreign policy concerns, courts could take cues from
Congress’s seeming indifference to the intrusion.
266. See supra notes 89–98 and accompanying text.
267. We take no position on the wisdom of preempting state laws in an “as-applied”
manner. We offer it up as an example of how the State Department may exercise this power,
and note that the State Department is the actor best equipped to make such determinations.
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4. Judicial Enforcement of Civil and Criminal Sanctions for
States and State Officials
The previous mechanisms consist of different methods of preempting
state law. But Congress might suppose that sometimes preemption is inade-
quate. After all, some state interference does not take the form of law, and
when it takes a nonlegal form, preemption is irrelevant. Recall the example
of Mayor Giuliani.268 No amount of preemption could have stopped his
treatment of Arafat. Moreover, whatever form state interference takes, Con-
gress might suppose that some such involvement is sufficiently troubling
that more severe consequences ought to attach as a means of deterring that
interference. A state law that discriminates against an ally and its nationals
does some harm, even if preemption prevents enforcement of its provisions.
Where Congress believes that preemption is insufficient, it may wish to
attach civil or criminal consequences to state involvement in foreign affairs.
For instance, Congress might wish to restrain bellicose states by imposing
fines on or imprisoning state officers who authorize a state to wage war
absent an imminent danger of invasion. Or consider the enactment of state
laws or resolutions that demonize the leadership of a foreign country—de-
nunciations that could lead to hostilities. Again, Congress might wish to
dissuade such vilification by attaching civil and criminal penalties.
Obviously, civil and criminal penalties should only attach when Con-
gress is certain that deterrence of state actors is absolutely necessary, where
state involvement most clearly interferes with the federal conduct of foreign
affairs, and where ex ante restraints are inadequate. Moreover, Congress
must ensure that it defines crimes with particularity in order to pass consti-
tutional muster. Vague standards will not do.
B. State Triggers
This section proposes five categories of state laws that Congress should
consider when choosing a mechanism. Our triggers cover the gamut of state
activity that might interfere with the federal government’s conduct of for-
eign affairs.
1. State Laws that Facially Distinguish Among Nations and Nationals
State laws that single out specific nations or nationals most clearly inter-
fere with the federal government’s conduct of foreign affairs, for such laws
make little pretense of regulating an area of traditional state concern. Such
state legislation can assume many shapes. States may decide not to conduct
business with a foreign sovereign; bar its instrumentalities from doing busi-
ness with firms headquartered in a particular nation; or treat adversely a
foreign sovereign’s citizens. Florida’s recently enacted HB 959 fits in the sec-
ond category, singling out companies that conduct business in Syria and
268. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
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Cuba.269 Floridian agencies are barred from engaging in a number of interac-
tions with companies doing business in those nations.270 The Massachusetts
law in Crosby, which barred state entities purchasing from any firms “doing
business with Burma,” was comparable.271 Of course, bills that disfavor for-
eign nations and citizens are not the only ones capable of mischief. This
trigger also would encompass state laws that favor sovereigns. To see why
such coverage is necessary, consider a state law that favors Israeli firms that
build settlements on the West Bank. The statute may seem of little moment
because it seems to harm no one. Yet the statute may well complicate our
relationship with the Palestinians, the Saudis, and others who oppose such
settlements. The point is that preferences for some countries can inflame
others. Moreover, through artful drafting, states can grant favorable treat-
ment to all but a handful of nations, effectively disfavoring those omitted.
We believe that laws that facially discriminate against (or in favor of)
certain nations call for our first mechanism—a flat ban. These sorts of laws
have a significant and obvious capacity to annoy foreign sovereigns. They
embarrass our federal government’s conduct of foreign affairs and undercut
the benefits of one informed and experienced federal voice in foreign affairs.
Because the state laws in this section are easily identifiable—after all,
they reference foreign nations or their nationals—and because the remedy is
plain—preemption—the judiciary is a capable arbiter. The courts need not
assess national interests in order to perform their role. They need not make
complex factual or policy determinations. They must do no more than de-
termine whether a state law facially discriminates against (or in favor of)
certain nations or nationals.
2. State Laws that Discriminate Based on Foreign Law
State laws that turn on the content of foreign law, even though they may
not identify particular sovereigns, nonetheless have the capacity to spark
hostility and recriminations. After all, such state laws mete favorable (or
269. Fla. Stat. § 215.471 (2015).
270. Id. Florida Governor Rick Scott bizarrely signed the bill into law, but speculated in
his signing statement that it is unconstitutional and thus unenforceable. Letter from Rick
Scott, Governor of Fla., to Ken Detzner, Fla. Sec’y of State, (May 1, 2012), http://
www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/5.1.12-HB-959-Transmittal-Letter1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7FDC-D6JU] (“[T]he restrictions will not go into effect unless and until Congress
passes, and President Obama signs, a law permitting states to independently impose such
sanctions against Cuba and Syria.”). We are not as certain about the law’s unconstitutionality.
Regardless, we would preempt it under the first category set forth in this section. Of further
intrigue, even Floridians recognized that this bill had uncertain, and perhaps undesirable,
effects in the international sphere. See Scott Signs Bill Banning Business Ties to Cuba, Syria,
Herald Trib. (May 1, 2012), http://politics.heraldtribune.com/2012/05/01/scott-expected-to-
sign-bill-banning-business-ties-to-cuba-syria/ [https://perma.cc/9RF6-K5NE] (describing
how, among other things, this bill was expected to enflame Brazil and Canada, two of Florida’s
most important foreign trading partners).
271. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 7, §§ 22J, 22H, 22M (2014), invalidated by Crosby v. Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (emphasis added).
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unfavorable) treatment based on the content of foreign laws, drawing dis-
tinctions that may annoy or infuriate foreign governments.
Again, such laws can take many forms. States might ban their agencies
from transacting with firms that do business in a communist country. They
may bar private firms from exporting to countries ruled by Sharia law. They
may prohibit agencies from conducting business with nations that take
property without compensation.
Our second trigger complements the first and prevents evasion of that
trigger. After all, if a state may not expressly punish Vietnamese or Cuban
entities but may penalize communist countries as a class, states may circum-
vent the first restriction with ease. Oregon’s inheritance law from Zschernig
is illustrative.272 Had Oregon simply enumerated a list of Eastern Bloc coun-
tries and discriminated against them in inheritance, the result would come
close to duplicating their actual, less particularized, law.273
One difference between a law that enumerates countries and one that
turns on the content of foreign law is worth discussing. A law that operates
in the latter fashion becomes inoperable against certain countries when they
change their laws. Perhaps encouraging such change is the entire point. But
as we have explained, the states lack knowledge and expertise, and their at-
tempts to punish (or favor) certain foreign laws undermine the federal gov-
ernment’s ability to form a comprehensive and unitary national policy with
regard to those foreign sovereigns.
A flat ban seems ideal because these laws have the tendency to anger
foreign governments and complicate the federal government’s stewardship
of foreign affairs. As with category-one triggers, we believe the courts are
well equipped to police these laws. Courts need do no more than determine
if a state law discriminates based on the content of foreign law.
3. Laws that Distinguish Based on Foreign Activity
We now move to triggers with broader sweep. Here we are concerned
with state laws that create rules that facially discriminate on the basis of
actions overseas. This is distinct from a focus on the laws of a foreign nation.
The waging of war would fall into this third category, but not necessarily the
latter. Likewise, nuclear weapons research and development would fall into
the former category, even though it might not fall into the latter. Even activ-
ity that occurs without the express blessing of a foreign sovereign—such as
religious practices—would be covered under this category if they took place
overseas. For an example of an actual state law that turned on foreign activ-
ity, consider California’s Holocaust Victims Insurance Relief Act—the focus
272. Or. Rev. Stat. § 111.070 (1957), invalidated by Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
(1968) (repealed 1969).
273. One might respond that Oregon’s law in Zschernig said nothing about communist
countries per se, even if communist countries were in fact the targets of the bill. This much is
true. Zschernig, 389 U.S. 429. However, Congress might well conclude that conditioning any
state activity on the laws of a foreign sovereign is enough. Thus, this trigger would sweep in
the facts of Zschernig.
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of Garamendi.274 The law discriminated based on the issuance of insurance
policies (action) in Europe (overseas).275
Absent this category, states could disrupt national foreign policy and yet
fall outside the prior two categories. For instance, a state with a considerable
Cambodian population could pass a law declaring that foreign nationals
who come from states with a genocidal past must submit to a background
check (to demonstrate that they are not war criminals) upon applying for
work in the state. The ultimate purpose of this law is to help the state’s
Cambodian population track down Pol Pot’s military officers. Of course,
this law makes no reference to a country by name, nor to its form of govern-
ment or laws, but will have a significant impact on a select few countries—
Cambodia chief among them. It is no stretch to suppose that such a law
could anger some nations.
Given the breadth of this category, some caution is in order. California,
for instance, could prohibit the import of genetically modified foods. But
suppose no nation actually exports such foods, meaning that the law seems
unlikely to upset any foreign sovereign. This California law is clearly not
designed with any sovereigns in mind. The state may not be interested in
influencing foreign affairs or swaying nations or their citizens.276 Instead, the
state seems to be regulating to protect the health of its populace.
Because this third trigger is broad and because these laws are perhaps
less likely to provoke international consternation, we believe State Depart-
ment preclearance is the most appropriate mechanism. Congress could de-
cide that the State Department (rather than the courts) should determine
whether new state laws that turn on overseas activities adversely impact our
foreign relations and whether those laws ought to take effect. Because not all
state laws that turn on foreign activity should be preempted, those making
the decision to preempt ought to be well informed about our foreign affairs.
Alternatively, Congress could judge that the State Department should be
able to temporarily suspend new state laws only if their operation causes
foreign controversies. For instance, even though state bars on the import of
genetically modified foods may not initially interfere with the nation’s for-
eign affairs, over time such laws could become problematic. Should nations
start to export genetically modified foods, the California ban could raise the
hackles of these nations and lead to a trade dispute with the United States. A
274. Cal. Ins. Code §§ 13800–13807 (West 2015), invalidated by Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
275. Id.
276. Some may suppose that laws subject to our first two triggers could be benign as
well—at least in the sense that they do not anger foreign sovereigns. Perhaps subjecting these
laws to a flat bar in all instances is thus overinclusive. But that hardly counsels against those
triggers, or the mechanism. As we explained in Part II, state interference in foreign affairs
yields costs that outweigh the benefits. Hence, a rule that presumptively disfavors clear state
involvement in foreign affairs will generate more favorable than unfavorable outcomes. More-
over, our first two triggers do not sweep in all state action that affects foreign affairs—only the
most egregious. Finally, Congress retains the power to exempt state bills and laws from the
applications of its various triggers and mechanisms.
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law that was once inconsequential, from a foreign policy perspective, now is
at the center of an international storm. At a minimum, a temporary suspen-
sion seems appropriate, as it would give Congress time to consider and craft
a more permanent response.
4. Any State Law that Disrupts the Federal Conduct of Foreign Affairs
Delineating where domestic affairs end and where foreign affairs begin
is challenging.277 Hence no statute can be drafted with the requisite precision
to sweep in all laws affecting foreign affairs while leaving undisturbed all
other laws. Moreover, the line between disturbing our nation’s foreign af-
fairs and intervening in inconsequential ways is no less uncertain.
Aware that there are no clear dividing lines, Congress may see the need
for a catchall, one that encompasses any state law that disrupts federal for-
eign policy. A slight tweaking of Garamendi’s facts offers a compelling ex-
ample of when such a law might be necessary. Begin with the premise that
the president believes that he has satisfactorily resolved issues pertaining to
Holocaust victim reparations with the German government. Now suppose
that California is unsatisfied with his resolution and passes a law broader
than the one at issue in Garamendi.278 Counterfactually, California evades
the strictures of our first four categories and passes a law requiring that all
insurance companies who wish to do business in the state to disclose details
related to policies issued between 1920 and 1945, without regard to where
those policies were written. There is no longer an international nexus to the
law, for the law is not limited to issuance in Europe. Yet the law may signifi-
cantly affect foreign affairs and lead to the unraveling of the president’s
agreement with the German government. Actual examples are available as
well. “Buy American” laws fall outside the first three categories, yet their
impact on our nation’s foreign affairs is real.279
Laws that fall into this broad category ought to be subject to the weakest
mechanism, a suspensive veto. Admittedly, under the status quo, Congress
may preempt state laws that interfere with foreign affairs. For instance, Con-
gress could invalidate existing state “Buy America” laws. However, this final
trigger and its corresponding mechanism would improve upon the current
state of affairs in two ways. First, the State Department would be able to act
277. See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Foreign Affairs Federalism and the Limits on Executive
Power, 111 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 1, 6 (2014), http://repository.law.umich.edu/
mlr_fi/vol111/iss1/9 [https://perma.cc/76CM-558U] (“Not only is the constitutional basis for
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine thin, but there is no coherent rule for drawing the line
around ‘foreign affairs.’ ”).
278. With the first four categories of our statute in place, the actual California law would
find itself in the third category, subject to State Department preclearance. This is because it
required insurance companies that issued policies in Europe between 1920 and 1945 to make
certain disclosures related to those policies. Cal. Ins. Code § 13804.
279. See, e.g., Kevin Carmichael & Heather Scoffield, Obama Sends Diplomat to Davos to
Quell Trade Outrage, Ctr. for Int’l Governance Innovation (Feb. 2, 2009), http://
www.cigionline.com/articles/2009/02/obama-sends-diplomat-davos-quell-trade-outrage/
[https://perma.cc/4LZB-4LVV].
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more quickly than Congress to suspend the law. Where a state law has seri-
ous and immediate effects on foreign affairs, waiting for Congress to act may
be less than ideal. Second, this structure gives Congress adequate time, as
well as assistance from an expert agency, to make a reasoned judgment.
Congress might suppose that a catchall is both necessary and proper. As
we have explained, without a catchall, many state laws that disrupt our na-
tion’s foreign affairs will evade the other four categories. Hence a catchall is
useful and thus necessary. Whether a catchall provision is proper is more
complicated. Our position is that a catchall would be proper because the
mechanism this category would trigger is rather restrained. The suspensive
veto itself only minimally disrupts state laws, with more lasting effects left to
the wisdom of Congress.
Some may argue that this trigger reaches too far. Whereas other triggers
encompass clear state intrusions into the foreign arena, this one operates
against all state laws that may, in the State Department’s judgment, be detri-
mental to our foreign relations. Suppose foreign states are disgusted by the
death penalty that many states employ. Should the State Department be able
to suspend state death penalty statutes because of their tendency to provoke
other nations? Moreover may Congress permanently preempt state death
penalty statutes on the grounds that they detrimentally impact the foreign
relations of the United States?
We admit that there may be constitutional limits to the reach of this
trigger. We leave it to others to delineate what those limits are. Suffice it to
say that if the Constitution constrains the reach of this trigger, then those
constraints should operate as implicit exceptions to the trigger’s reach. Per-
haps the courts will find constitutional carve outs in as-applied challenges.
Moreover, Congress may believe that there are constitutional limits on the
reach of this trigger and impose those limitations on the suspensive power
that it grants to the State Department.
That there might be some limits to the reach of this mechanism hardly
means that the use of this trigger is somehow constitutionally impermissible.
We do not believe there is anything unsound in the general notion that Con-
gress can preempt state laws that make the federal stewardship of foreign
affairs more difficult or unmanageable, even if there are constitutional limits
to what sorts of state laws the federal government may preempt.
5. Conduct and Speech by State Officials
We turn to state conduct and speech, a category distinct from state laws,
and the possibility that the federal government might wish to deter such
conduct and speech on the grounds that they interfere with the federal gov-
ernment’s conduct of foreign affairs. Like the federal government, states that
wish to establish their own distinct foreign policies have two options. They
can enact laws and allow those laws to speak to foreign nations. Alterna-
tively, they can use more informal conduct and speech, such as legislative
resolutions, gubernatorial proclamations, or other conduct. No less than
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laws, these informal means of expressing state foreign policy can prove
troublesome.
By way of example, foreign affairs conduct might consist of state officers
discriminating against foreign dignitaries. Mayor Giuliani’s conduct towards
Arafat likely fits within this category, as would situations where state officers
refuse to provide protection to a disfavored foreign dignitary. The state ar-
rest of an ambassador is a classic example of an act that has serious foreign
policy implications because such an arrest is contrary to international law.
State speech that implicates foreign affairs requires no stretch of the im-
agination. State legislators may enact resolutions condemning Iran. In a bid
to attract the electoral support of a state’s significant Arab populace, a gov-
ernor might condemn Israel. State judges may gratuitously insult another
nation’s system of government. If these examples seem farfetched, recall
Mayor Giuliani’s branding of Arafat as a “terrorist.”280 Or consider that a
supermajority of states have passed resolutions recognizing the Armenian
genocide, determinations in tension with federal policy on the subject.281
Because inflammatory conduct, speeches, and resolutions tend to aggra-
vate tensions, Congress may wish to stifle them. Congress may suppose that
muffling state conduct and speech conduces to a superior federal steward-
ship. After all, if the federal government may preempt state laws in conflict
with that goal, but must tolerate meddlesome state conduct and speech, the
one-voice objective may prove unattainable.
A congressional bar on state conduct and speech that interferes with
foreign affairs raises three difficulties. First, there are questions of definition.
What is state speech or conduct that interferes with foreign affairs? Second,
there is the problem of scope. To whom will such a bar apply? Assuming the
bar covers governors and state legislators, what about less consequential ac-
tors like police officers? Finally, the First Amendment lingers in the back-
ground, raising significant constitutional concerns.
Sketching the contours of what constitutes speech and conduct that in-
terferes with foreign relations is no easy task, and arbitrary line drawing is
likely necessary. Some activity will no doubt remain unregulated if Congress
writes a statute narrow enough to pass judicial scrutiny. Indeed, we hope
that Congress initially treads lightly. Yet the narrowness of federal statutes
limiting the conduct and speech of state officials is hardly an indictment of
its usefulness.
On scope, Congress might tailor such a statute to sweep in only those
actors who might plausibly be thought to represent the entire state. Gover-
nors, of course, should be included. So too might the legislature when con-
sidered as a unit (for instance, where it proposes to pass certain resolutions),
while legislators themselves might be exempt. State Attorneys General and
Secretaries of State might also come within the terms of the statute.
280. Firestone, supra note 2.
281. See Armenian Nat’l Committee of Am., supra note 27.
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A local police chief, on the other hand, is an example of a state official
on the other end of the spectrum—one whose speech is perhaps so insignif-
icant that she should be omitted. In between these two poles is a wide range
of actors whose voices have varying resonances in the international arena.
We leave the line drawing to Congress, but note that limitations on the
number of state officials covered will buttress the case for the measure’s
constitutionality because it will tend to show that the federal statute’s means
are more closely tailored to its end.
For similar reasons, we believe that a thoughtful and restrained defini-
tion of “conduct and speech that interferes with foreign relations” would
conduce to the measure’s constitutionality. Mayor Giuliani’s conduct should
surely be included. It is inappropriate for a local official to forcibly eject a
foreign dignitary from a public event. We also would include Giuliani’s con-
demnation. The branding of Arafat as a terrorist and a murderer has the
obvious tendency to inflame.
More generally, we believe a narrowly drafted federal statute would be
constitutional. To begin with, there is a long history of Congress regulating
state conduct and speech that interferes with foreign affairs. As for conduct,
recall that the Crimes Act of 1790 made it a crime to attach or seize the
property of foreign ministers, a prohibition that expressly extended to “all
officers.”282 It also made it a crime to imprison or assault ambassadors, a bar
that applied to state officers no less than private parties.283 Likewise the Neu-
trality Act barred all persons from assisting warring parties, a ban that ex-
tended to state officials that sought to aid France.284 As for speech, the Logan
Act passed in 1798, continues to criminalize speech designed to influence the
conduct of foreign governments towards the United States.285 Its prohibition
covers state officers, including governors, legislators, judges, and
employees.286
As noted, some modern commentators insist that the Logan Act is un-
constitutional.287 Though we have some sympathy, a couple of points are
worth bearing in mind. First, as we noted earlier, the Court has never de-
clared that states (as opposed to private parties) even have First Amendment
rights.288 Obviously if the states lack such rights, there can be no First
Amendment problem with federal regulation of state speech in foreign
affairs.
282. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 25–26, 1 Stat. 112, 117–18.
283. Id.
284. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381.
285. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2012).
286. Id.
287. See supra notes 256–259 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., Fagundes, supra note 254, at 1637–39 (“Courts have varied in their receptiv-
ity to the notion that the First Amendment may extend to government speech. The majority of
courts have reflexively rejected the notion . . . .”); see also id. at 1676 (proposing that state
actors receive no First Amendment protections if “the government speaker [is not] institution-
ally well suited to engage in the speech in question”).
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Second, modern doctrine makes it possible to adopt content- or view-
point-based restrictions on speech when doing so is necessary to further a
compelling interest, and where the means are narrowly tailored to advancing
that interest.289 As compared to other interests the courts have found com-
pelling—diversity in higher education, for instance290—the interest in assur-
ing that our foreign relationships are not imperiled by amateurish state
interventions seems undeniable. For instance, a federal statute barring state
condemnations of religions (such as Islam), censures of foreign heads of
state, or alleged genocides would seem quite compelling to us. As for the
narrowly tailored requirement, we believe that narrowly crafting the class of
officials and speech may satisfy the courts. Although we leave the particulars
to Congress, we note that our recommendation—that such a bar cover only
state speech—goes some way toward neutralizing concerns.
Our claim is not that all suppression of official state speech and action
in foreign affairs would, in all circumstances, be constitutional. If a particular
nation’s people or leaders were phlegmatic or stoic, meaning that they were
unmoved by criticism, then perhaps Congress should be indifferent to state
interference with that relationship. For instance, if the bond between the
United States and a foreign nation is incredibly strong—the unique relation-
ship with Great Britain comes to mind—maybe no level of state criticism or
actions will ever be of consequence, in which case no federal statute should
regulate state speech or action directed towards Great Britain. More gener-
ally, if, over time, foreign states prove rather insensitive to the insults of
American states, in the way they are insensitive to boorish comments found
in an internet chat, then a federal statute condemning state speech in foreign
affairs would advance no compelling interest.
We believe that state conduct or speech that falls into this category
should be subject to our fourth mechanism. Deterrence can come from civil
and criminal penalties imposed on state violators, with the fines collectible
by federal prosecutors in court. The courts can then hear defenses against
such prosecutions, including claims that the relevant federal statute pro-
scribing state conduct and speech in foreign affairs is unconstitutional.
Conclusion
For decades the courts have struggled to contain state forays into the
international arena. The courts recognize that the states have little expertise
or experience in foreign affairs and that the periodic and often ill-considered
state interventions can irritate allies and comfort adversaries. Yet in serving
as umpires of foreign affairs federalism, the courts have relied upon strained
readings of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties. The results are unedify-
ing judicial doctrines that sporadically and arbitrarily erect roadblocks to
state involvement in foreign affairs.
289. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (applying this test to content-based
restrictions on speech relating to foreign affairs).
290. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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The courts have the right policy impulses. But the judiciary is the wrong
institution to set the first-order rules for state involvement in foreign affairs.
The Constitution, because it never guarantees states a role in foreign affairs
and because it empowers Congress to enact necessary and proper laws for
executing federal powers, authorizes Congress to determine when and how
states may engage in foreign affairs. Congress, rather than the courts, should
be in the driver’s seat.
Seeking to alter the terms of the debate, we have suggested a set of trig-
gers and a set of appropriate statutory responses to the problem of state
intervention in foreign affairs. The statutory mechanisms are designed to
help eliminate the problems that arise from particular forms of state involve-
ment. The precise mix is for Congress to decide.
We encourage other scholars to consider the right combination of trig-
gers and mechanisms, permutations that may be more or less permissive
than the ones we have suggested. We also hope that others will consider our
novel claim that Congress may help carry into execution federal foreign af-
fairs powers by precluding state forays into foreign affairs.
